THE BAWKU CONFLICT: A Chronological Review of Events from Pre-Independence to the Present

ABSTRACT
The Bawku conflict is one of Ghana's most protracted and complex inter-ethnic disputes, rooted in the colonial reorganisation of traditional authority in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. Centred on competing claims between the indigenous Kusasi and the settler Mamprusi communities over paramount chieftaincy (the Bawku skin) and allodial land rights, the conflict has persisted through successive political regimes, legislative reversals, and periodic armed outbreaks for nearly seven decades since Ghana's independence. This article provides a comprehensive chronological examination of key events and milestones in the Bawku conflict, from pre-colonial origins through the colonial era, post-independence political interference, legislative reversals, armed outbreaks, and the most recent peace efforts as of 2025–2026. The analysis draws on historical records, academic literature, and documented events to offer a structured timeline that illuminates the causes, escalations, and ongoing challenges to sustainable peace in Bawku.

Keywords: Bawku conflict, Kusasi, Mamprusi, chieftaincy dispute, Ghana, Upper East Region, colonial legacy, ethnic conflict, land rights, NLCD 112, PNDC Law 75

1. INTRODUCTION

The conflict cannot be understood in isolation from its historical antecedents. While open hostilities are largely a post-independence phenomenon, their roots lie in pre-colonial population movements, the establishment of trade routes, and — critically — the administrative decisions of British colonial authorities that fundamentally altered existing power relations between the two groups. Post-independence governments further compounded the problem through a series of contradictory legislative and executive interventions, each of which, rather than settling the dispute, succeeded only in deepening grievances on one side or the other.

This article traces the chronological arc of the Bawku conflict from the pre-colonial era to the present day, presenting a structured timeline of key events, legislative turning points, episodes of violence, and peace initiatives. As a teacher of mathematics at Bawku Senior High School, the author writes from a perspective shaped by direct proximity to the conflict's impact on education, community life, and the daily existence of ordinary citizens.

2. PRE-COLONIAL ORIGINS (Pre-1900)

Any serious engagement with the Bawku conflict must begin with an understanding of the settlement histories of the two principal ethnic groups involved. The origins of both communities are traced to ancient migration routes, and their early interaction was, by most historical accounts, largely peaceful.

2.1 The Kusasi

Historians and anthropologists largely agree that the Kusasi are the autochthonous people of the Bawku area, having emigrated southwards from the historical Mali Empire as far back as the 13th century. They are organised around earth-priest institutions known as tindaana, through which they exercise custodianship over the land. As an acephalous society — that is, a society without a centralised political authority or paramount chief — the Kusasi placed less emphasis on formal chieftaincy. Land rights and communal identity were mediated through the tindaana rather than through a hierarchical royal lineage.

2.2 The Mamprusi

The Mamprusi trace their origins to Naa Gbewa, a legendary ancestor whose descendants are said to have migrated from the Lake Chad basin (or Zamfara in present-day northern Nigeria) and settled at Pusiga, a community located a few kilometres from Bawku. Upon Naa Gbewa's death, his sons dispersed and founded the kingdoms of Mamprugu, Dagbon, and Nanun — constituting the broader Mole-Dagbani group. Mamprusi oral tradition places their presence in the Bawku area as early as the 17th century, attributed to military assistance rendered to the Kusasi during the reign of Nayiri Na Atabia (c. 1690–1741), when incursions from the Bissa compelled the Kusasi to seek Mamprusi military protection.

2.3 The Pre-Colonial Arrangement

During the Trans-Saharan trade era, Bawku emerged as a significant commercial hub, situated along trade routes connecting Salaga, Nalerigu, and the Sahelian north. As commercial activity intensified, the Nayiri — paramount chief of the Mamprugu kingdom — stationed Mamprusi princes and traders in Bawku to protect merchants along these routes. This arrangement was initially non-contentious. The Mamprusi restricted their chieftaincy authority to their own subjects, and the Kusasi, indifferent to formalised political authority, raised no objection. As one oral tradition puts it, in the pre-colonial era, 'nobody had a qualm with anyone.'

It was not until external forces — first Bissa incursions and later British colonial administration — fundamentally restructured these relationships that the seeds of future conflict were sown.

3. THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1900–1957)

The formal incorporation of the Northern Territories into the British Gold Coast Protectorate in the early 20th century marked a decisive turning point in Kusasi-Mamprusi relations. British colonial policy, guided by the principle of indirect rule, sought to govern native populations through existing traditional authorities. However, in areas where centralised chieftaincy was absent or weak — as was the case among the acephalous Kusasi — the British created or imposed such authority where none had previously existed.

3.1 Key Colonial Events and Dates

1900–1902: British colonial administration formally extends over the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. Colonial officers begin categorising ethnic societies as either 'centralised' or 'acephalous', a distinction that would have profound political consequences.

c. 1690–1741: Mamprusi military assistance to the Kusasi during the reign of Nayiri Na Atabia is later cited by the Mamprusi as historical justification for their authority in Bawku. The Nayiri begins stationing princes in Bawku.

c. 1721: According to Mamprusi accounts, the Bawku skin (paramountcy) is founded and placed under Mamprugu. This date is contested by Kusasi historians.

1931: The British formally bring the Kusasi under the authority of the Mamprusi Bawku Naba, subjecting an acephalous people to the paramountcy of a group they regarded as settler newcomers. From this moment, Kusasi sources record increasing feelings of political subjugation.

1932: The Mamprusi Conference of 1932 formalises dominant-subordinate relations between the Mamprusi and the Kusasi under colonial indirect rule. Kusasi leaders begin to register complaints about tribute payments, forced labour, and marginalisation. The district is renamed the Kusasi District.

1932–1957: Under colonial administration, successive Mamprusi chiefs govern Bawku as Bawku Naba. The Kusasi, though the clear majority population, have no formal political representation within the chieftaincy structure. Grievances simmer beneath a surface of enforced compliance.

1954–1956: Multi-party electoral politics arrive in the Gold Coast, intensifying ethnic faultlines. The Kusasi largely align with Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP), while the Mamprusi align with the Northern People's Party (NPP), which later merges into the United Party (UP). Electoral competition sharpens communal identities.

1956: Bawku Naba Naa Wuni Bugri Saa, the 12th Bawku Naba, passes away. His death creates a succession crisis that will ignite the first open phase of the chieftaincy conflict.

The British colonial policy of indirect rule, though administratively convenient, fundamentally distorted the pre-existing social order in Bawku. By imposing centralised Mamprusi authority over an acephalous Kusasi people and entrenching these arrangements in legislation, the colonial government created structural conditions for conflict that its own administrators privately acknowledged but never resolved before independence in 1957.

4. POST-INDEPENDENCE AND THE FIRST REPUBLIC (1957–1966)

Ghana's independence from British colonial rule on 6th March 1957 did not bring peace to Bawku. Instead, it unleashed the accumulated grievances of the preceding decades, as the Kusasi — emboldened by the spirit of self-determination and aligned with the ruling CPP government — moved to assert their autonomy from Mamprusi overlordship. The period 1957–1966 is characterised by the first open outbreak of the conflict, the establishment of a government commission of inquiry, competing legal challenges, and the CPP government's politically motivated recognition of a Kusasi paramount chief.

4.1 Key Events and Dates

March 1957: Ghana achieves independence from British colonial rule. Inspired by the broader spirit of liberation, the Kusasi declare their own chief — Naba Abugrago Azoka — as Bawku Naba, thereby rejecting continued Mamprusi overlordship. The simultaneous existence of two claimants to the Bawku skin triggers immediate disturbances. This moment is widely regarded as the formal genesis of the Bawku conflict.

1957: The Governor General of Ghana establishes the Opoku-Afari Committee of Inquiry to investigate the chieftaincy dispute in Bawku. The committee, chaired by a lawyer from the Volta Region and comprising Nana Agyeman Badu I and the Dormaa Hene, travels to Bawku, takes testimony, and concludes that Mamprusi authority was historically unjust and administratively undemocratic. The committee's report favours the Kusasi claim and recognises Abugrago Azoka as the legitimate Bawku Naba.

1957: The Mamprusi contest the Opoku-Afari Committee's findings before the Divisional Court. The court upholds the Mamprusi challenge and quashes the committee's report.

1958: The Nkrumah-led CPP government appeals the court's decision. The Appeals Court overturns the lower court ruling and upholds the Opoku-Afari Committee's original finding, recognising Abugrago Azoka (Kusasi) as Bawku Naba. Some Mamprusi chiefs who oppose the decision are replaced with Kusasi and pro-CPP personalities. The Mamprusi interpret this as a political reward to the Kusasi for their electoral support of the CPP.

1959: The CPP government enacts the Chiefs Recognition Act, 1959, which allows the government to remove chiefs perceived as disloyal and install individuals not necessarily from royal families. This is used to further consolidate Kusasi and CPP-aligned chieftaincy positions in the Bawku area. Mamprusi communities are deeply aggrieved.

1960–1966: A relative but tense period of Kusasi paramountcy under Nkrumah's government. The Kusasi Bawku Naba governs, but Mamprusi resistance continues through legal and political channels. Electoral divisions between CPP (Kusasi) and UP/NPP (Mamprusi) supporters fuel communal tensions.

5. MILITARY RULE AND LEGISLATIVE REVERSALS (1966–1983)

The overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah's government in the military coup of 24th February 1966 brought about a radical reversal of the 1957–1958 pro-Kusasi settlement. The new National Liberation Council (NLC), led by Lt. General Emmanuel Kotoka, was sympathetic to the Mamprusi position, and within months of seizing power enacted legislation that undid nearly a decade of Kusasi political gains.

5.1 Key Events and Dates

February 24, 1966: Kwame Nkrumah's CPP government is overthrown in a military coup by the National Liberation Council (NLC). The political environment shifts dramatically against the Kusasi, whose chieftaincy gains had been closely tied to the CPP administration.

1966: The NLC enacts the Chieftaincy Amendment Decree, NLCD 112, which reverses key chieftaincy decisions made since 1957 and places all newly created paramountcies back under their former paramount chiefs. Under this decree, Abugrago Azoka is removed as Bawku Naba. The Nayiri of Mamprugu appoints and enskins Naa Adam Zangbeo as the 14th Bawku Naba — a Mamprusi. Violent clashes follow as Kusasi communities resist the reimposition of Mamprusi overlordship.

1966–1969: The Kusasi, dispossessed of their paramountcy, challenge NLCD 112 in the courts. The matter of Republic v. Abugrago Azoka Ex Parte Alhaji Adam Zangbeo is filed before the High Court. The court takes judicial notice that Abugrago Azoka had been dis-enskinned under NLCD 112. The name of the district is also changed from 'Kusasi District' to 'Bawku District', and the traditional council is renamed from 'Kusasi Traditional Council' to 'Bawku Traditional Council' — changes opposed by the Kusasi and welcomed by the Mamprusi.

1970–1979: Mamprusi Bawku Naba Naa Adam Zangbeo governs Bawku. While surface stability is maintained through security deployments, underlying Kusasi resentment intensifies over land access, tribute, and political marginalisation.

1979: Ghana returns to civilian rule under the Third Republic of Hilla Limann. Political party competition once again exacerbates communal divisions in Bawku.

1979–1983: Naa Adam Azangbeo (Mamprusi) continues as Bawku Naba until 1983. Periodic communal tensions are reported.

December 31, 1981: Jerry John Rawlings seizes power in a military coup, establishing the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). Kusasi communities, sensing another political opportunity for reversal, petition the new government to restore the status quo ante.

1983: The PNDC government enacts PNDC Law 75, the Restoration of Status of Chiefs Law, which reverses NLCD 112 and restores all affected paramountcies to their former independent status. However, Abugrago Azoka — the Kusasi chief whose restoration is intended — had died earlier in 1983. Posthumously, PNDC Law 75 recognises him as having died as a chief. His son, Nicheama Abugrago Azoka (later known as Animchema Asigri Abugrago), succeeds to the Bawku skin as a Kusasi Naba.

1983–1985: Violent clashes erupt in and around Bawku in response to the legislative reversal. The reimposition of Kusasi paramountcy following NLCD 112's repeal provokes fierce Mamprusi resistance. Several deaths and significant displacement are recorded.

1985: The PNDC enacts PNDCL 107, which removes certain chiefs based on political affiliations, further disrupting customary chieftaincy selection processes and deepening grievances.

The period 1966–1983 exemplifies the most destructive pattern of the Bawku conflict: the use of state power by successive governments — civilian and military — to reverse the chieftaincy decisions of their predecessors for political rather than legal or customary reasons. Each reversal deepened mistrust, emboldened the newly advantaged party, and intensified grievances on the losing side, creating a cycle of conflict that no single legislative act could break.

6. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND RECURRING VIOLENCE (1992–2010)

Ghana's return to multiparty democracy under the 1992 Constitution introduced new dynamics into the Bawku conflict. Electoral competition, party patronage, and the quest for political control of the Upper East Region meant that national politicians from both the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) had strong incentives to align with one faction or the other. Far from bringing resolution, democratic governance largely perpetuated the same pattern of politically motivated interventions that had characterised previous regimes.

6.1 Key Events and Dates

1992: Ghana adopts the Fourth Republican Constitution and returns to multiparty democracy. Electoral mobilisation in Bawku once again falls along Kusasi-Mamprusi lines, with the NDC broadly supported by Kusasi communities and the NPP finding more support among Mamprusi factions.

1994–1996: Renewed outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence in Bawku are recorded during election seasons. Firearms, increasingly smuggled across the porous border with Burkina Faso, begin to feature in clashes — a marked escalation from the sticks and machetes of earlier confrontations.

2000–2001: Major violence erupts in Bawku and surrounding towns. Reports from this period cite dozens of deaths — predominantly Mamprusi — with a particularly deadly flare-up in December 2001 in which approximately 50 people are killed and significant displacement occurs. Curfews are imposed and security forces deployed.

2001: Following the change of government, the Mamprusi mount a legal challenge before the Supreme Court, alleging that PNDC Law 75 is unconstitutional. This marks the first time the Bawku chieftaincy dispute reaches the Supreme Court. The case is later discontinued by the applicant, leaving core constitutional questions unresolved.

2007–2010: Further rounds of violence are documented in Bawku by Ghanaian media and civil-society monitors, with periodic gun battles, targeted killings, and market closures. Each episode follows a pattern of provocation, retaliation, and security deployment without underlying resolution.

2009: The Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee is convened with the support of civil-society organisations, including the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), to facilitate community-level dialogue and early-warning mechanisms. This represents the first significant structured local peacebuilding initiative in the conflict's history.

2010: UNDP and UNICEF provide programmatic support for mediation and livelihood initiatives in Bawku. The conflict is increasingly recognised at the international level as a chronic humanitarian and security concern.

7. CONTEMPORARY CRISIS AND ESCALATION (2021–2025)

From late 2021, the Bawku conflict entered its most sustained and lethal phase in decades. A combination of accumulated grievances, the proliferation of small arms, the withdrawal of a rival chief's arrest warrant, and the broader insecurity caused by jihadist insurgencies in neighbouring Burkina Faso converged to produce a conflict far more dangerous and complex than any of its predecessors. The period 2021–2025 is characterised by sustained hostilities, a rapidly rising death toll, repeated military deployments, high-level political attention, and the most serious mediation effort in the conflict's history.

7.1 Key Events and Dates

November–December 2021: Violence reignites in Bawku following the return of a rival Mamprusi claimant to the Bawku skin after the withdrawal of his arrest warrant by a court of appeal. Shooting incidents on December 27, 2021 between Kusasi and Mamprusi groups mark the formal return to open armed conflict. Schools, hospitals, and markets are closed. A curfew is imposed and security forces reinforced.

2022: Armed clashes continue across Bawku and surrounding communities. The Ghana Small Arms Commission raises alarm over the volume of illicit firearms smuggled into the area across the Burkina Faso border. Mutual embargoes between communities prevent Mamprusi from accessing Kusasi-controlled markets and vice versa, causing economic paralysis. The government deploys additional military units.

2023: Ghana deploys approximately 1,000 troops to Bawku following the killing of an immigration officer in the conflict zone — the largest single military deployment in the conflict's history. In August 2023, the Bawku Municipal Chief Executive publicly states that close to 200 people have been killed since November 2021 — a figure he acknowledges exceeds official police records. A 2024 Clingendael Institute policy note similarly documents hundreds of conflict-related fatalities in the 2021–2024 period.

2023–2024: Security analysts and international organisations begin to flag the potential for jihadist groups from Burkina Faso's deteriorating security environment to exploit the ethnic tensions in Bawku. Reports of RPG deployments and multi-round automatic weapons fire — atypical of the conflict's earlier character — indicate the involvement of more organised armed actors. Ghana's Armed Forces report incidents of gunmen directly engaging their patrol teams.

October 28, 2024: The Interior Ministry of Ghana imposes a 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew in Bawku in response to renewed clashes. The death toll from the October 2024 outbreak reaches 16, as stated by the Minister of Chieftaincy and Religious Affairs, Stephen Balado Manu. National media report repeated renewals of the curfew in subsequent months.

2023–2025: The Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, accepts a government mandate to chair formal mediation sessions between representatives of the Kusasi and Mamprusi parties. This marks the highest-profile and most sustained mediation initiative in the conflict's history, backed by government officials, security agencies, and prominent traditional rulers including the Nayiri of Mamprugu.

April 9, 2025: A violent clash in Bawku results in the death of one person and injuries to two others, including a student, after police reportedly open fire near Gandhi City, a suburb of Bawku. Properties belonging to the Ghana Police Service are destroyed by youth. President John Dramani Mahama condemns the violence but expresses confidence in the Asantehene's mediation process.

April 2025: Renewed public debate about the origins and resolution of the conflict intensifies, with politicians, historians, and community leaders offering competing narratives. The Member of Parliament for Zebilla, Cletus Avoka, calls for a return to the rule of law and respect for the historical record in resolving the dispute.

July 2025: Violence surges again in Bawku. Reuters and Ghanaian national media report the killing of a Kusasi chief in Kumasi — reportedly by Mamprusi individuals — and the killing of three high school students in separate attacks in Bawku. The government responds by deploying additional troops and tightening curfew measures. The residence of Bawku Member of Parliament Mahama Ayariga is set ablaze by gunmen. Ghana's Communications Minister, Felix Kwakye Ofosu, announces a shift from a peacekeeping to a 'peace enforcement' posture for deployed security forces.

December 16, 2025: Asantehene Otumfuo Osei Tutu II presents his formal mediation report to President John Dramani Mahama at the Jubilee House in Accra. He clarifies that the process constitutes a mediation exercise and not arbitration — meaning the parties retain ultimate decision-making authority. The report is welcomed but its implementation remains a work in progress as of the time of writing.

8. ROOT CAUSES: A SYNTHESIS

First, colonial legacy and structural distortion. The British colonial administration's imposition of Mamprusi paramount authority over the acephalous Kusasi in 1931–1932 fundamentally disrupted pre-existing social arrangements and created a framework for dominance and resistance that outlasted colonialism itself.

Second, contested legitimacy of successive legal and political interventions. Each post-independence government — Nkrumah's CPP, the NLC, the PNDC, and subsequent democratic administrations — intervened in the chieftaincy dispute for political rather than strictly legal reasons. The result is a set of mutually contradictory legislative instruments (NLCD 112, PNDC Law 75) whose competing claims have never been definitively resolved by any court with full jurisdiction over the substantive issues.

Third, electoral politics and partisan instrumentalisation. The consistent alignment of the Kusasi with one political tradition and the Mamprusi with another has ensured that each change of government brings the prospect of a reversal of the previous settlement, perpetuating a cycle in which neither party can trust any resolution as permanent.

Fourth, proliferation of small arms. The easy availability of firearms — smuggled through Bawku's porous border with Burkina Faso — has fundamentally transformed the character and lethality of the conflict since the 2000s, enabling organised armed groups to sustain prolonged campaigns rather than engaging in episodic communal clashes.

Fifth, Sahelian insecurity overspill. The deterioration of security in Burkina Faso, Mali, and the broader Sahel, driven by jihadist insurgencies, has introduced a new and dangerous dimension to the Bawku conflict. The risk that extremist groups may seek to exploit ethnic tensions to establish a foothold in Ghana's northernmost municipality represents a qualitative escalation of the threat environment.

9. PEACE INITIATIVES: PROGRESS AND LIMITATIONS

Over the decades, various actors — governmental, non-governmental, traditional, and international — have attempted to broker peace in Bawku. While none has achieved lasting resolution, these efforts have occasionally produced periods of relative calm and have refined understanding of the conditions necessary for sustainable peace.

Government commissions of inquiry (1957, 1978) produced findings that were subsequently overturned by political decisions, demonstrating the futility of technical solutions without political will. Court proceedings, including the Supreme Court case of 2001, similarly failed to produce definitive resolution because the parties have consistently pursued political rather than judicial paths when judgments went against them.

Civil society and NGO-led initiatives, particularly the Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee (2009) and WANEP's early-warning programmes, have contributed to localised de-escalation and community resilience, though their reach and resources are inherently limited compared to the scale of the problem.

The Asantehene's mediation (2023–2025), the most high-profile initiative to date, represents a significant development. Its credibility rests on the moral authority of the Asantehene as Ghana's most respected traditional ruler, the government's commitment of security and logistical support, and the inclusion of both parties in structured dialogue. The December 2025 submission of a formal mediation report to the President is a concrete milestone. However, the fundamental political question of which legislative framework governs the Bawku skin — PNDC Law 75 or some other instrument — remains unresolved.

10. IMPACT ON EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY LIFE

As a teacher at Bawku Senior High School, the author is acutely aware of the conflict's devastating consequences for education and social development in the area. Repeated school closures during periods of intense violence have disrupted the academic progress of thousands of students over the years, with the most severe disruptions recorded in 2001, 2007–2010, and 2021–2025. Students, teachers, and education administrators have fled the municipality during escalations, depleting institutional capacity that takes years to rebuild.

Healthcare delivery has been similarly impaired, with health workers departing during crises and facilities unable to function when curfews restrict movement. Market closures and mutual embargoes between communities have caused economic hardship that falls most heavily on the poorest residents. The psychological toll on communities — particularly on children and young people who have grown up knowing no other reality — is incalculable and largely undocumented.

Ultimately, the greatest cost of the Bawku conflict is not measured in the number of deaths or the value of property destroyed, but in the generations of young people whose potential has been stunted by a dispute they did not create and cannot, by themselves, resolve.

11. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Bawku conflict is, at its core, a conflict of legitimacy — about who has the right to govern, who owns the land, and whose historical narrative is authoritative. It is also a conflict that has been systematically worsened by the actions of external political actors who have prioritised short-term electoral and partisan advantage over the long-term interests of the communities they purport to serve.

Achieving sustainable peace in Bawku will require, at a minimum, the following: a comprehensive, politically independent review of all relevant legislative instruments — particularly NLCD 112 and PNDC Law 75 — by the judiciary, culminating in a Supreme Court ruling that definitively resolves their constitutional status; a commitment by all political parties to remove the chieftaincy dispute from partisan electoral competition; a sustained economic development programme for the Bawku area to reduce the resource competition that exacerbates communal tensions; a coordinated disarmament programme targeting the flow of small arms through border communities; and continued support for community-level reconciliation and dialogue initiatives.

The Asantehene's mediation initiative of 2023–2025 offers a genuine foundation on which lasting peace might be built — but only if its outcomes are translated into binding political commitments, implemented with consistency, and monitored by credible independent bodies. History has shown, all too clearly, that in Bawku, the absence of war is not the same as the presence of peace.

By
Mubarik Adam Danzumah
Mathematics Teacher, Bawku Senior High School

Diploma in Basic Education | BSc Mathematics Education | MEd Mathematics Education

April 2026

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Clingendael Institute (2024). Policy note on conflict-related fatalities in Bawku, 2021–2024. Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Longi, F. Y. T. (2014). The Kusasi-Mamprusi conflict in Bawku: A legacy of British colonial policy in Northern Ghana. Ghana Studies, 17, 155–185.

McGovern, M. (2011). Making war in Côte d'Ivoire. University of Chicago Press.

West Africa Network for Peacebuilding — WANEP (2022). Early warning report: Bawku inter-ethnic conflict. WANEP Ghana.

Wikipedia contributors (2026, January 26). Bawku conflict. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bawku_conflict

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ACCORD (2023). Emerging local voices and new possibilities toward attaining sustainable peace in Bawku, north-eastern Ghana. African Journal on Conflict Resolution.

SOAS School of Law (2024). Navigating historical and legal shortfalls to resolve the Bawku chieftaincy conflict in Ghana through court-connected mediation. SOAS University of London.

© Mubarik Adam Danzumah | Bawku Senior High School | April 2026

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