You Cannot Call 60% Uranium “Peaceful”

There is a peculiar sleight of hand in much of the discourse surrounding Israel and Iran. Israel conducts strikes deep inside Iranian territory, eliminates senior regime figures and frames its actions as defending against an existential threat. Critics, rightly, respond that cross-border attacks, targeted killings, and strikes on sovereign territory risk violating international law and escalating regional conflict. That critique is entirely legitimate. Sovereignty, proportionality and necessity remain core principles of the law of armed conflict. Yet, in the same breath, many commentators treat Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly its rapid enrichment to 60 percent uranium-235, as if it were a benign technical exercise, a minor regulatory issue rather than a geopolitical flashpoint. This selective lens obscures the very real legal, strategic and moral questions surrounding Tehran’s nuclear activities. If Israeli action merits scrutiny, so too must Iran’s nuclear trajectory.

The Fragile Legal Case for Iran
Iran’s formal legal argument is superficially persuasive but fundamentally fragile. Tehran points to Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which affirms the “inalienable right” of non-nuclear-weapon states to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. By this measure, uranium enrichment is not automatically illegal. Yet Article IV exists in tandem with Articles II and III of the NPT, which prohibit the acquisition of nuclear weapons and mandate comprehensive safeguards, respectively. A right to peaceful enrichment does not negate the obligations to maintain transparency, cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and prevent diversion to military ends. In other words, enrichment is conditional: it must be demonstrably peaceful. Iran’s recent behaviour, both in terms of enrichment levels and inspector access, raises serious doubts about its compliance with these obligations.

International Oversight and Non-Compliance

These doubts were formally recognized in June 2025, when the IAEA’s 35-member Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in nearly two decades. The resolution passed by 19 votes to 3, with 11 abstentions, reflecting a broad consensus rather than a unilateral condemnation. The censure focused on Iran’s failure to provide credible explanations for uranium traces at undeclared sites and its ongoing obstruction of full inspections. This was not a matter of partisan commentary; it was a multilateral determination by the world’s principal nuclear watchdog. The decision underscored that a mere invocation of Article IV does not confer immunity from the broader legal framework that governs non-nuclear-weapon states.

Enrichment Levels and Strategic Implications

The enrichment itself underscores the seriousness of the challenge. Civilian nuclear power reactors typically require uranium enriched to roughly 3–5 percent, while research reactors may demand enrichment up to around 20 percent. By contrast, Iran has produced uranium enriched to 60 percent, far beyond civilian norms and closer to weapons-grade material than to standard fuel. As of March 2025, the IAEA reported that Iran possessed 275 kilograms of 60 percent-enriched uranium, up from 182 kilograms the previous quarter, noting that it was the only non-nuclear-weapon state enriching to this level. By June 2025, the stockpile had risen to 440.9 kilograms, a quantity that, if further enriched, could yield enough fissile material for roughly ten nuclear weapons, according to the IAEA’s own technical benchmarks. Reports indicated that over 200 kilograms of this material were stored in tunnel complexes near Isfahan, further complicating verification efforts. These figures are not abstract; they represent a tangible strategic capability that places Israel and indeed the broader Middle East, on alert.

The Latent Weapons Option
The distinction between 60 percent enrichment and weapons-grade uranium, commonly pegged at 90 percent, is real but misleading in context. The most technically challenging phase of enrichment is progressing from natural uranium to the high-enriched range; the final stretch from 60 percent to 90 percent is comparatively brief. A state that holds hundreds of kilograms at 60 percent is not at the base of the nuclear mountain; it is well along the slope, capable of a rapid technical leap if the political decision were made. This creates a latent weapons option with compressed breakout timelines, even if no explicit decision to weaponize has been taken. The IAEA Director General, Rafael Grossi, has emphasized that there is currently “no credible indication of a coordinated nuclear weapons programme” in Iran. Yet the absence of evidence of intent does not negate the existence of material capability, opacity and risk, a critical triad in international security assessments.

Opacity and the Limits of Verification

Opacity has compounded the problem. Following the June 2025 escalation, Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA deteriorated sharply. By early 2026, the agency reported a loss of what it calls “continuity of knowledge”, its ability to verify the size, composition and location of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. Access restrictions at key sites, including Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan, now prevent inspectors from confirming whether enrichment has truly been suspended. In February 2026, the IAEA explicitly noted that it could no longer track the full status of Iran’s materials due to gaps in monitoring and reporting. This lack of verifiable oversight undermines Iran’s claim that its nuclear activities are exclusively civilian. A state cannot credibly insist that a programme is peaceful while simultaneously weakening the mechanisms designed to substantiate that claim.

Context Matters
Context further intensifies the issue. Iran has spent decades financing and arming a constellation of proxy militias across the region, including Hezbollah and other anti-Israel actors, while consistently framing Israel as an illegitimate state. Its political rhetoric, combined with a growing uranium stockpile capable of rapid weaponization, creates a credible perception of existential threat in the minds of Israeli policymakers. It is this combination of material capability, strategic opacity and historical hostility that informs Israel’s threat perception, even as the international community debates the proportionality and legality of its responses.

Hypocrisy, Responsibility and the Middle Ground

Critics of Israeli action often point to hypocrisy, noting that Israel is not an NPT signatory, maintains a policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity, and has historically avoided international verification obligations. These points are valid: Israel’s own nuclear posture is opaque, legally exceptional and has contributed to regional instability. Furthermore, as of Days 18–19 of the conflict, official reports indicate more than 2,000 deaths across Iran, Lebanon, Israel, Iraq and the Gulf states due to strikes, missile attacks and ongoing hostilities, highlighting the human cost of escalation.

Major figures killed include high-ranking Iranian security officials (e.g., Ali Larijani), alongside losses among civilians and combatants on multiple sides. That reality demands serious legal and moral scrutiny. However, Israel’s potential overreach does not absolve Iran of responsibility for its nuclear strategy. The fact that one actor may act outside international norms does not render another actor’s high-risk, threshold nuclear behaviour benign.

The Weak Moral Case for Iran
The moral case for Iran’s nuclear posture is particularly weak. A programme is not deemed peaceful solely because a treaty clause permits enrichment; it is judged on intent, transparency and context. Iran’s enrichment to 60 percent, far beyond civilian needs, coupled with obstruction of inspections, fails these tests. Civilian justification for such high enrichment levels is essentially nonexistent. Even research reactors rarely require more than 20 percent enrichment. To produce 60 percent uranium in hundreds of kilograms while denying inspector access is to strain the definition of “peaceful” to its breaking point. The international community is entitled to treat such conduct as high-risk and strategically destabilizing.

Consistency and Rules-Based Order

Consistency is crucial. A rules-based international order cannot selectively enforce legality. If cross-border military strikes require stringent justification, then nuclear brinkmanship must meet a similar standard. Sovereignty, verification and escalation risk must be applied universally. Iran cannot invoke Article IV of the NPT as a protective shield while ignoring the transparency and compliance obligations that give the right meaning. Similarly, the international community cannot demand accountability from Israel without demanding the same rigour from Tehran. Principles of law and morality must be universal, not selectively applied.

Steps towards Credibility
For Iran to rebuild credibility, several concrete steps are essential. First, enrichment must be capped at levels consistent with civilian use, below 5 percent or limited research applications fully monitored. Next, the 60 percent stockpile should be blended down or exported. Then, full IAEA access to all key facilities must be restored, ensuring continuity of knowledge. Finally, Iran must adhere fully to the Additional Protocol and respond comprehensively to outstanding questions regarding undeclared sites. Only through such measures could Iran begin to satisfy both the legal and moral requirements of a genuinely peaceful programme.

The Burden of Proof Shifts
Until such steps are taken, the international community must confront a difficult reality: Iran’s nuclear programme, while formally framed as civilian, has created a latent weapons capability that materially increases regional risk. Legal technicalities cannot substitute for credible verification or moral responsibility. Likewise, Israel’s military response, however fraught with legal ambiguity, exists in the context of this heightened threat. Both actions must be scrutinized, but neither can be ignored. Once a regime accumulates enough near-weapons-grade uranium for multiple potential bombs while obstructing inspections, the burden of proof shifts. At that point, the question is no longer hypothetical: it is whether anyone serious can still regard the programme as peaceful.

Conclusion
Ultimately, the debate is not about choosing which side is “right” or “wrong.” It is about maintaining intellectual and legal consistency. Israel’s actions may be contestable under international law, yet Iran’s nuclear strategy: enrichment to near-weapons levels, opacity and insufficient engagement with inspectors, is indisputably destabilizing. Both sides operate in a gray zone, but the consequences of selective interpretation are profound. Treating one as a violation and the other as innocuous is neither analytical nor responsible. A rules-based order requires that rights and obligations be observed equally, that verification precedes trust, and that no state is permitted to gamble with annihilation while cloaking itself in technicalities.

The writer is a journalist, journalism lecturer, and a member of the Ghana Journalists Association, the Society of Professional Journalists, Investigative Reporters and Editors and the African Journalism Education Network. Email: achmondmy@gmail.com

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