Election Petitions, Stay of Execution & Parliamentary Vacancies: The Kpandai Case

“Where an application is pending for determination under sub rule (1) the proceedings for execution of the judgment or decision to which the application relates shall be stayed.” Rule 27(2) Court of Appeal Rules 1997 (C.I 19) as amended by C.I 132

INTRODUCTION
The High Court, Tamale on November 24, 2025 rendered a decision in the case of ‘In the matter of Article 99 of the Constitution of Ghana 1992, and In the Matter of Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act 1992 (PNDCL 284) as amended and In the Matter of a Petition by Daniel Nsala Wakpal Challenging the Declaration by the Electoral Commission of Matthew Nyindam as Member of Parliament Elect for the Kpandai Constituency pursuant to Parliamentary Elections held on 7^th December 2024 between Daniel Nsala Wakpal v. Matthew Nyindam and Electoral Commission’[1] declaring the Parliamentary elections in the Kpandai Constituency null and void and ordered for a rerun within thirty (30) days. The parliamentary seat had been won in the December 2024 polls by the New Patriotic Party Candidate, Matthew Nyindam. Upon so declaring, there was controversy, some people were excited and people as expected were aggrieved. The Minority in Parliament rejected the judgment,[2] while the majority side as is expected welcomed the judgment.[3] This led to some statements regrettably made by aggrieved persons and even a violent attack on the judicial system.[4] The Speaker of Parliament, Rt. Hon. Alban S.K Bagbin on 27^th November 2025 informed Parliament that there is a seven-day window that stays the execution of the orders of the High Court Tamale automatically.[5] The law is that after judgment, an execution creditor or a judgment victor ought not take any step towards execution in the seven days immediately following the notice of the judgment. The Court of Appeal Rules[6] as amended[7], the law relevant to this subject provides that, “There shall be a stay of execution of the judgment or decision appealed against for a period of seven days immediately following the giving of notice of the judgment or decision”[8]. Prior to the amendment by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules C.I.132, the rule 27 of C.I 19 provided that, “There shall be a stay of execution of the judgment or decision, or of proceedings under the judgment or decision appealed (a) for a period of seven days immediately following the giving of the judgment or decision; and (b) for a period of seven days immediately following the determination by the Court below of an application under subrule (1)(a) where the application is refused by the Court below.”[9] What the Speaker failed to add was that after the seven days, the aggrieved party could appeal and file an application for stay of execution, which until determined, stayed the orders of the High Court, Tamale. This declaration by the Venerable Speaker of Parliament was necessitated by calls that the said Member of Parliament after the judgment was no longer a Member of Parliament and so will not be allowed into the chamber of Parliament or granted audience in Parliament.[10]

The declaration by the High Court, Tamale, the Order for a rerun of the Kpandai Parliamentary election, the letter from the Clerk of Parliament notifying the Electoral Commission of the ‘vacancy’ and the attempts to prevent the embattled Member of Parliament from entering the chamber of Parliament have generated controversy as to whether upon the declaration of the High Court Tamale, ipso facto, the embattled Member of Parliament’s seat had become vacant under Article 112(5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, warranting the Clerk of Parliament to notify the Electoral Commission for a by-election to be conducted. This was a subject of controversy and a basis for some confrontations among Parliamentarians creating a scene on national television on December 09, 2025.[11]

The Author in this paper explores the subject matter of challenging Parliamentary elections in Ghana, at what time can it be said that a vacancy in an election petition has occurred, to warrant notification from the Clerk of Parliament to the Electoral Commission, whether a stay of execution has the same effect on Parliamentary election petitions as it has in regular civil litigation. It shall be the thesis of the Author that a vacancy in a parliamentary election petition arises warranting the notification of the Electoral Commission only when the right of appeal has not been exercised within the time permitted for such and the time has elapsed or those processes have been exhausted. It shall be argued that, when the appellate processes have been invoked and an application for stay of execution and other judicial processes like application for certiorari are pending, the Clerk of Parliament cannot and should not notify the Electoral Commission of a impugned vacancy and the need for a by-election since same is being challenged under the judicial processes as sanctioned by the same 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Equally the Electoral Commission cannot and ought not purport to organize the rerun when the judgment that declared the vacancy is being challenged in court with an appeal, stay of execution and application for certiorari as in the instant case.

Challenging Parliamentary Election in Ghana.

A person who seeks to challenge the election of a Member of Parliament can do so with an election petition only before the High Court without more. The person must present a petition to the High Court. The law is that, “the High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any question whether (a) a person has been validly elected as a member of Parliament or the seat of a member has become vacant; or (b) a person has been validly elected as a Speaker of Parliament or, having been so elected, has vacated the office of Speaker.”[12] Section 16 of the Representation of People Law 1992[13] provides that, “The validity of an election to Parliament may be questioned only by a petition brought under this Part”.[14] The law continues to provide the fora for such challenges thus, “Every election petition shall be presented before the High Court for hearing.”[15] On who can present the petition, the law provides that, “An election petition may be presented by one or more of the following persons – (a) a person who lawfully voted or had a right to vote at the election to which the petition relates; (b) a person claiming to have had a right to be elected at the election; (c) a person alleging himself to have been a candidate at the election; (d) a person claiming to have had a right to be nominated as a candidate at the election.”[16] This implies that the capacity to bring a petition is not the preserve of the losing candidate at the polls but any of the persons above can present a petition to challenge the election of a member of Parliament. A person who does not meet the test above will be incapacitated from mounting a parliamentary election petition.

Of particular importance is the time within which the petition must be filed. It is imperative because if a petitioner fails to file within the time provided by statute, that person is out of court, with the consequence of affecting the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit. If a petition is filed out of the time permitted by the law, the court would have no jurisdiction to entertain such, and if the court does, its orders and proceedings are amenable to the quashing orders of a superior court. Section 18 of the law provides that, “An election petition shall be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election to which it relates, except that a petition questioning an election on an allegation of corrupt practice and specifically alleging a payment of money or other award to have been made by the person whose election is questioned or to have been made on his behalf to his knowledge, may be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the alleged payment.” The Courts have held that an election is complete upon the declaration of results and publication in the gazette.[17] In the case of the Republic v The High Court, Sunyani; Ex parte Alhaji Collins Dauda,[18] Dr. Date-Bah J.S.C. delivered the unanimous voice of the Supreme Court thus, “Accordingly, our conclusion from reading the provisions of PNDCL 284 together is that, even in the case of an allegation of a corrupt practice, an election petition may be brough only after the Electoral Commission has declared a result in relation to the election.” The apex court further stated that, “….It can be cogently argued that an election whose results have not yet been declared is an inchoate or incomplete election, rather than an election…” The Author suggests that, the twenty-one days therefore start counting from the declaration and subsequent publication in the gazette. In some instances, the law generally permits a party to seek the leave of the court for extension of time within which to take certain steps. Regarding time for filing petitions for parliamentary elections, the law provides that, “The time limit provided by this section for the presentation of an election petition shall not be extended.”[19] The law also provides that, “the presentation of an election petition under subsection (1) is not valid unless within the time specified in subsection (1), the petitioner gives a security for costs an amount of money determined by the High Court”.[20] The Author however notes that the framing of the section 18(1) seems to create the uncertain impression that when the petition to challenge the election is based on corrupt practices or alleging the payment of money or any other such, the petition may be presented within twenty-one days after the alleged payment. Case law however suggests that until the election results are declared and gazetted, a course of action does not arise to amount a challenge. The apex court in the case of The Republic v High Court, Koforidua Ex Parte: Dr. Kofi Asare; Baba Jamal Mohammed Ahmed and 2 Others and Electoral Commission as Interested Parties[21] said, “The Constitution makes a valid assumption that at the time the High Court assumed jurisdiction, a person has already been elected in the relevant Parliamentary election. Thus by reading the two provisions together, the High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction in this matter, is to determine whether the person elected was validly elected or not. Therefore, where no persons has been elected in a Parliamentary election, assumption of jurisdiction by the High Court in a matter relating to the validity of the election can only be wrongful within the meaning of clause 1(a) of Article 99 of the 1992 Constitution. The question for the High Court to determine here is ‘has someone been validly elected? Thus, where no such ‘someone’ has been elected in the first place, no issue arises as to whether he was validly elected or not and the High Court’s jurisdiction is not ripen yet.”[22] The learning therefore is that, the only time a petition can be presented is within twenty-one days after the election is complete, results declared and gazetted.

The High Court would, upon filing of all relevant processes conduct a trial or hearing of the evidence of all parties. The High Court may grant appropriate relief based on the processes filed and evidence adduced at the hearing. Under the law, “After the hearing of an election petition the High Court may make any of the following orders – (a) declare that the election to which the petition relates is void; (b) declare that a candidate other than the member whose election is questioned was duly elected; (c) dismiss the petition and declare that the member whose election is questioned was duly elected.[23]” The law under Article 99 confers a right on an aggrieved person to appeal and challenge the decision of the High Court. Article 99(2) of the 1992 Constitution provides that, “A person aggrieved by the determination of the High Court under this article may appeal to the Court of Appeal.” As part of the appeal processes the execution of the High Court Judgment can be stayed with an application for stay of execution. The filing and service of same should, in the Author’s view, stay the hands and prevent the execution of the decision to enable the judicial vehicle to run to its logical conclusion. It is only after the appellate or other superior judicial bodies have pronounced on the challenges mounted against the determination of the High Court that one can say a vacancy in an election petition has occurred.

Stay of Execution and its effect on Proceedings

After a judgment is granted, the law affords an aggrieved party the option to appeal against that judgment. An appeal is a creature of statute, not common law or inherent jurisdiction,[24] and an appeal is by rehearing[25] the requirement or condition precedents for same must be complied with before the right becomes vested[26]. There are timelines for exercising such rights. Merely filing an appeal does not prevent the successful party in the court below from proceeding to execution. The trite position of the law is that an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution.[27] The Court of Appeal Rules[28] provides in that regard thus, “An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution under the judgment or decision appealed against unless the Court otherwise orders on an application made to the court by motion on notice.” A party seeking to stay an execution of a judgment must after the notice of appeal, therefore file an application for stay of execution either before the court below or repeat same before the appellate court.

The grounds for consideration or the grant for stay of execution applications are also well settled and may not be too relevant for purposes of this paper, save to state that an applicant for a stay of execution must meet a certain threshold failing which the application must fail. This position has been held in numerous decisions including without limitation to NDK Financial Services Limited v Yiadom Electrical and Construction Works and Others [2007-2008] 1 SCGLR 93, Livingstone Djokoto v BCC Industries Civil Appeal No. J4/10/2010 etc.

The court before whom an application for stay of execution is made ensures that it acts in such a way that in granting or refusing to grant, the success of the appeal is not rendered nugatory among others. In the case of Joseph v Jebeille and Another[29] the Supreme Court said that “It is the paramount duty of a court to which an application for stay of execution pending appeal is made to see that the appeal, if successful, is not rendered nugatory.”

The effect of an application for stay of execution is essentially to prevent the judgment victor from proceeding to levy execution to benefit from the fruit of the judgment so obtained until the determination. The question is whether the mere filing of an application for stay of execution operates as a stay or same must be granted by the court with an express Order before it is effective to stay the execution. In the case of In the matter of the Estate of Albert Kwame Appiah alias Nana Appiah-Kubi of Bomeng via Effiduase in the Ashanti Region and in the Matter of Application for Probate by Afua Antwiwaa and Kwame Adjei and In the Matter of Albert Kwaku Appiah and 3 Others vrs Afua Antwiwaa[30] The Court of appeal sitting in Kumasi[31] said “Thus, even, if it is true that the motion for stay of execution had been pending for well over a year before the High Court, that fact alone does not cause the motion to lapse and until it is moved, the motion remains pending before the Court and to the extent that it is a motion for execution, no execution can lawfully take place until the motion has been dealt with in any way lawful.” Their Lordships continued that, “…However, until the motion is dealt with, execution could not take place. The whole process of execution in the face of the pendency of the motion for stay of execution was not sanctioned by any law or rule of procedure.”

Also in the case of Ogyedom Obranu Kwesi Atta IV v Ghana Telecommunication Co. Ltd and Lands Commission[32], their Lordships at the apex court admonished thus, “While an appeal is pending for determination it is in accord with fairness and in particular , process integrity that nothing be done to the judgment debtor such that before the decision has finality, he is made to pay up the entirety of the judgment debt or a substantial portion thereof thereby rendering the victory on appeal nugatory. What this portrays is that when a court is confronted with an application for stay of execution, its main focus should be to delicately balance the competing rights of the parties under the judgment on appeal such that a reasonable onlooker apprised of the facts can say that the decision of the court on the application was a just one and not one that keeps people wondering whether in the circumstances there is any purpose in exercising the constitutional right to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal to the ultimate court ”

In the case of the Republic v High Court, Commercial Division Accra, Ex Parte: Millicom Ghana Limited and 3 Others, Superphone Company Limited (Interested Party)[33], the Supreme Court[34] speaking through Justice Paul Baffoe-Bonnie JSC (as he then was) distilled the law elegantly thus, “It is a natural sequence in civil trials that once a person feels aggrieved by any decision of a trial court, be it interlocutory or final, he has the right to appeal to a higher body by filing a notice of appeal. It is provided by all the Rules of Court, namely the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (CI 47), the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (CI 19), and the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (CI 16), that an appeal in itself does not operate as a stay of execution. However, the same rules provide that when an application for stay of execution is pending for hearing, it stops execution until the same is heard and dismissed. The relevant provision in CI 19 r 27(2) states that, “Where an application [for stay of execution] is pending for determination under sub-rule (1) the proceedings for execution of the judgment or decision to which the application relates shall be stayed.” His Lordship Baffoe-Bonnie proceeds to provide the rationale thus, “The rationale behind rule 27(3)(a) and (b) of CI 19 is to ensure that an aggrieved party is given some time to file any processes to stop execution. And, indeed, in this case immediately after the decision…”

From the above discourse, it is obviously the judicial thinking that when an application for Stay of Execution is before the court for determination, the order of the court sought to be executed is suspended by the operation of law owing to the pendency of the motion for stay of execution. In this case therefore, the filing, service and the pendency of the application for stay of execution before the court ought to prevent the Clerk of Parliament from proceeding to notify the Electoral Commission and making arrangement for the rerun or by-election respectively.

In the case of the Kpandai Parliamentary Election, the Notice of Appeal had been filed, motion for stay of execution has been filed and an application for certiorari has also been filed. Despite the pendency of all these, the Clerk of Parliament has written to the Electoral Commission, and the Electoral Commission had also fixed a date for the rerun of the election. In the humble view of the Author, unless there is a different principle known to law, this step betrays constitutional loyalty, and the culprits can be candidates for a successful contempt proceeding for taking steps to bring the administration of justice into disrepute by seeking to take steps that would overreach the courts. Any step to proceed to conduct the rerun before the judicial processes are exhausted demonstrates a partial instead of a wholistic reading of the 1992 Constitution.

Intervention by the Supreme Court and the ‘Constitutional Clockwork’

In the course of the controversy, the aggrieved party aside filing an appeal and a stay of execution, had also filed an application for certiorari to bring the proceedings of the High Court Tamale to the Supreme Court for purposes of quashing and quashing same[35]. Before the Supreme Court would be clothed with jurisdiction to hear the application, the Respondent must be served with the application. The Applicant, unable to personally serve the Respondent in accordance with the rules applied for an Order for Substituted Service to serve the Respondent. The Apex Court on December 16, 2025 granted the application and ordered the Applicant to serve the Respondent by substituted service.[36] As a consequence of this, the Apex Court ordered the suspension of the rerun of the by-election as scheduled by the Electoral Commission to abide the determination of the Supreme Court[37]. This posture, order and directive by the Supreme Court support the view of the Author that once the judicial processes have been engaged to challenge the determination by the High Court, all processes must abide the determination of the Courts in whom final judicial power including determination or declaration of vacancy arising out of parliamentary election petition is vested under the 1992 Constitution.[38]

Some have argued that there is a certain ‘constitutional clockwork’ which is ticking after the declaration of the vacancy and that cannot allegedly be stopped by the pending judicial processes. The Author disagrees with this view as same is inapplicable to this instant case. This view, with respect, fails to take cognizance of the rights of the person whose election is being challenged among others which rights are also conferred on the aggrieved person by the same Constitution. The respected Kwame Boafo Akuffo Esq. for instance had argued elsewhere in his usual elegance that, “…to be able to understand these matters, it is important for us to be able to look at the future of the past and when I say we have to look at the future of the past, we have to look at the prevailing law or the precedential value of judgments, decisions and practice on what led to this situation. We are here confronted with a situation in which a court of law has made an order that a rerun should be done in respect of a constituency. Parliament and all other organs of government and the citizenry are bound by that decision of the court. In fact, Parliament as lawmakers, are not supposed or they are not entitled to undermine the integrity of a binding judgment. Until this judgment is suspended or vacated or overturned for that matter that judgment is binding on Parliament. Now we have to keep in mind two things, unlike a private matter where a stay of execution will be in the form of the Moffat rule where when there is a stay of execution it is akin to an order and people have to stay their hands, in a constitutional dispute, the mere pendency of an application of stay of execution does not stop the constitutional clockwork. We are therefore to contend with a situation where the Clerk of Parliament’s attention has been drawn to the judgment of the High Court, all members of Parliament, the Majority and the Minority are bound by that constitutional clockwork and therefore when the Speaker declares a vacancy he is acting in accordance with Article 112(5) of the 1992 Constitution. Even with respect to Chieftaincy matters, when there is an application for injunction against a chief, unless a formal order has been obtained, the chief will continue working or conduct himself as a Chief for the very simple reason that he is integral to the administration of the governance at the local government level, and that is why Judges like Amadu Tanko JSC and Kulendi JSC have stated that because we do not have preliminary feutus as to the frivolity of cases which come into our court house, in constitutional matters unless a formal order has been secured the mere pendency of it can cause confusion…..[39]. He continues thus, “Therefore in the wisdom of men like Kulendi JSC and Amadu Tanko JSC, hey have thought that it is proper that in constitutional matters the situation should not be that the mere pendency of an application holds the clockwork back. Under the circumstances the clerk of was constitutional correct, whether it was constitutionally convenient and practical for governance is another issue and that is a matter for the sociologists…”

The Author although admires the eloquence of the learned Kwame Boafo Akuffo Esq, with royal respect disagrees with his reasoning on the substance of his argument. First, the Author takes the view that, A Clerk of Parliament or any other person for that matter, aware of proceedings seeking to challenge and stay the execution of a judgment of the High Court before the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal is not bound to follow the impugned decision of the High Court which is being challenged with an appeal, stay of execution and an application to quash the said Order. Such persons must respect and pay obeisance to the judicial processes and stay their hands till the Court makes a pronouncement on the processes before it. The Clerk of Parliament was therefore wrong in law to communicate to the Electoral Commission of the ‘vacancy’ being aware of further judicial processes that had been activated. Any attempt to take steps to overreach the judicial processes seeking to challenge the High Court Order or judgment amounts to contempt of the Court and may be punished. Secondly the pendency of an application for stay of execution pending appeal and a motion for certiorari stops the supposed constitutional clockwork. The judicial processes are all constitutional mechanisms and therefore must not be subordinated by the desire to take steps that would in the end over-reach the Supreme Court or make the successful appeal nugatory. Thirdly, the analogy drawn by the learned Kwame Boafo Akuffo regarding the Moffat rule dealt with application for interlocutory injunctions and not stay of executions. Last but by no means the least, there is no principle known to law that distinguishes between the effect of stay of execution in private matters and constitutional disputes. That distinction was drawn in respect of interlocutory applications like injunction applications which are taken before the determination of the suit as opposed to motions for stay of executions which are filed after a determination whether final or interlocutory.

The learning received in the Vincent Ekow Assafuah v The Attorney General[40] case which is passively being used in support of the view taken by the respected Kwame Boafo Akuffo and all who take his position, is inapplicable to application for stay of execution to the extent that the Assafuah case was specific to interlocutory injunctions and not motions for stay of executions, the effect of the filing, service and pendency of which is well settled by previous decisions of the apex court including the case of Ex Parte Millicom[41] cited supra.

Internal Inconsistency or the need to read the Constitution as a Whole.

Supporters of the position of the Clerk of Parliament argue that there is no specific order granting the stay of execution and that the Clerk of Parliament has an obligation to perform under Article 112 (5) of the 1992 Constitution which provides that, “Whenever a vacancy occurs in Parliament, the Clerk to Parliament shall notify the Electoral commission in writing within seven days after the vacancy occurred, and a by-election shall be held within thirty days after the vacancy occurred.” Further support for this view is found in the Representation of People Law[42], section 12(1) thereof which provides that, “(1) Whenever a vacancy occurs in the membership of Parliament, the Clerk to Parliament shall notify the Commission in writing within seven days after the vacancy occurred, and a by-election shall be held within thirty days after the vacancy occurred.” While the Author agrees with the position that the mandate of the Clerk of Parliament is to notify the Electoral Commission within seven days upon the occurrence of a vacancy, the Author suggests that, vacancy in respect of a parliamentary election petition only occurs when all the available remedies for seeking judicial redress by an aggrieved party have been exhausted or that the aggrieved party having such rights fails to exercise same and the time for so exercising has elapsed, or better still in the Author’s view, if the aggrieved person shows a clear indication not to challenge same. The Representation of Peoples Law[43] in some instances provides in that regard that, “When a member of Parliament is adjudged or declared bankrupt or of unsound mind or sentenced to death or imprisonment, the decision shall not have the effect of causing him to vacate his seat in Parliament until, (a) where no appeal is lodged, the time within which an appeal may be lodged has expired; or (b) where an appeal is lodged, the appeal has been finally disposed of.”[44] The Author suggests that if the seat of a person declared bankrupt or unsound mind or sentenced to death cannot be declared vacant until no appeal is lodged within the time allowed or appeal is disposed of, there is no reason why the same principle should not apply to a vacancy arising from a parliamentary election petition. This is especially so when no law suspends the right of an aggrieved party in an election petition to use the judicial process in challenging the decision of the High Court. The Author is not oblivious of the expressio unius Alterio rule (that the express mention of others exclude others not expressly mentioned) but suggests same is not applicable in this instance since applying same will result in a constitutional absurdity. When the Constitution is read as a whole as it should be, one would come to the conclusion that a vacancy does not arise from a parliamentary petition until the judicial avenues have been fully exhausted.

The subject of determination of a vacancy of a seat in Parliament in an election petition is reserved for the Judiciary and not the Parliament of Ghana through the Clerk or even Speaker. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana has vest that power in the High Court thus, “(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any question whether - (a) a person has been validly elected as a member of Parliament or the seat of a member has become vacant; or (b) a person has been validly elected as a Speaker of Parliament or, having been so elected, has vacated the office of Speaker.”[45] This jurisdiction is given to the High Court as a court of first instance which decision is subject to appeal as any other case. The law provides that, “A person aggrieved by the determination of the High Court under this article may appeal to the Court of Appeal.” The decision of the High Court therefore is not final and does not bring finality to a parliamentary election petition, since a party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court[46] has held in the case of In Re Parliamentary Elections for Wulensi Constituency; Zakaria v Nyimakan[47] that the Court of Appeal is the final court of appeal in election petition without further right to the Supreme Court, the Author respectfully disagrees with their Lordships at the apex court, save to say that that remains the law as held by the law lords but that will be for another paper. But this case recognises that, the decision by the High Court does not bring the issue of vacancy to finality. Parties must therefore be allowed to exercise their rights of appeal before any step is taken to prejudice such rights constitutionally conferred.

When does a Vacancy really occur in a Parliamentary election petition?

It is imperative to answer this question because it has constitutional consequences and significance. Under Article 112 clause 5 of the 1992 Constitution, the notification by the Clerk of Parliament to the Electoral Commission depends on the occurrence of a vacancy. At the risk of sounding repetitive, Section 12 of the law provides that, “Whenever a vacancy occurs in the membership of Parliament, the Clerk of Parliament shall notify the Commission in writing within seven days after the vacancy occurred, and a by-election shall be held within thirty days after the vacancy occurred.” Under general principles of law, a party seeking to challenge a judgment or decision can appeal against the decision. An appeal does not amount to an automatic stay of execution. The Court of Appeal Rules[48] provide in this regard that, “An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the judgment or decision appealed against except where the court below or the Court otherwise orders- (a) in the case of the court below, upon application made orally or by motion on notice to it; and (b) in the case of the Court, upon application made to it by motion on notice, and except as provided in this rule no intermediate act or proceedings shall be invalidated.”[49] The import is that the mere fact that an appeal has been filed does not preclude the victorious party from levying execution. So there is the need for an application for Stay of Execution, which when filed and served, ought to stay the hands of the victorious party from levying execution. It is humbly contended that the service and pendency of same must stay the hands of any person seeking to execute the order being challenged. This provision does not have an exception to any proceedings including one involving parliamentary petitions. The law is unambiguous when it provides that, “When an application is pending for determination under sub-rule (1) of this rule any proceedings for execution of the judgment or decision to which the application relates shall be stayed.[50]” The applicability of this rule does not exclude parliamentary election disputes. The logical inference therefore is that, once an application for stay of execution is yet to be determined, the execution of the judgment sought to be appealed against must be suspended. This finds support in case law including the case of Afua Antwiwaa and Kwame Adjei and In the Matter of Albert Kwaku Appiah and 3 Others vrs Afua Antwiwaa[51] cited supra. This is in addition to the automatic seven day stay under Rules 27(3) of C.I 19 as amended by CI 132 thus, “There shall be a stay of execution of the judgment or decision appealed against for a period of seven days immediately following the giving of notice of the judgment or decision.”

To the mind of the Author therefore, unless and until all avenues open to an aggrieved person under an election petition before the court has been exhausted, it cannot be argued that a vacancy in an election petition has occurred. It is trite that final judicial power is vested in the Judiciary. Article 125 (3) provides that, “The judicial power of Ghana shall be vested in the Judiciary, accordingly, neither the President nor Parliament nor any organ or agency of the President or Parliament shall have or be given final judicial power.” The Clerk of Parliament therefore has no right or duty to notify the Electoral Commission that a vacancy has occurred as a result of the decision of the High Court when there are pending judicial processes the effect of which must stay the execution with the possible consequence of reversing the verdict of the High Court. Without going into the merits of the instant case, what is at stake includes an allegation that the petition was filed outside the statutory time limit, which is a matter for the apex and appellate courts to pronounce on. Therefore, any purported letter to the Electoral Commission by the Clerk of Parliament and date for a rerun can at best be described as attempting to circumvent and overreach the judicial process which can indeed amount to contempt of the court.

Distinction between Injunction and Stay of Execution

There is usually the analogy drawn between Application for Interlocutory Injunctions and Stay of Execution. Injunction, when it is interlocutory as opposed to perpetual, seeks to stop certain acts pending the final determination of a suit. Usually, the application for interlocutory injunction is determined before the hearing of the substantive suit. Stay of Execution on the other hand deals with attempts to stop or prevent the execution of a judgment or decision of the court whether final or interlocutory, pending the determination by the appellate court or any such. Application for stay of execution is filed after the hearing and determination of an issue by the court.

There is the temptation to cite the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Vincent Ekow Assafuah v Attorney General[52] which held that the mere filing of an application does not operate to stay the hands of a constitutional body from carrying out a constitutional function as authority for the motion that a stay of execution does not stay the hands until an express order. To the extent that the two applications are essentially not the same, the Author takes the view that this case may not necessarily apply to the pendency of applications for stay of execution.

The Vincent Ekow Assafuah v Attorney General case can be distinguished from the facts of this instant case, and the Author suggests that even if the applications were both interlocutory injunctions, the facts make it distinguishable. The essential facts of the Assafuah case were that, the Plaintiff commenced an action on the back of the presentation of the petition for the removal of Chief Justice Torkonoo. His reliefs inter alia included a declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of Articles 146(1), (2), (4), (6) and (7), 23, 57(3) and 296 of the Constitution, the President is mandated to notify the Chief Justice about a petition for the removal of the Chief Justice and obtain his or her comments and responses to the content of such petition before referring the petition to the Council of State or commencing the consultation processes with the Council of State for the removal of the Chief Justice. It was his claim that the failure of the President to notify and obtain the consent of the Chief Justice before commencing the consultation processes amounted to interference with the independence of the Judiciary as well as a violation of the fundamental rights of the Chief Justice to a fair hearing under Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution. On these bases, the Plaintiff filed an application for interlocutory Injunction restraining the President and the Council of State from proceeding with the consultation processes for the removal of the Chief Justice under Article 146 of the 1992 Constitution until the final hearing and determination of the suit. It appears the application was overtaken by certain events hence the Plaintiff filed a second application for interlocutory injunction deposing that although the first application sought to restrain the President and the Council of State from proceedings with the process of consultation on the petitions, the consultation nevertheless continued, which consultation resulted in a determination that the petitions had prima facie cases against the Chief Justice requiring the setting up of the Article 146 committee. It was further alleged that the President proceeded to suspend the Chief Justice on the advice of the Council of State. Hence the second injunction application sought to restrain any step or action from being taken as part of the processes for the removal of the Chief Justice under Article 146 or in any manner and an order suspending the warrant of suspension of the Chief Justice Issued by the President under Article 146(10) of the Constitution 1992 until the hearing and final determination of the instant action.

The learned Attorney General in an affidavit opposing the application argued inter alia that, the processes for the removal of the Chief Justice was constitutionally compliant with Article 146 and the prescriptions of case law. It was further contended by the Attorney General in opposition that, roundly rejected the Applicant’s contention and submitted that, “neither the Constitution nor case law (properly considered) required the President to take a response from a Chief Justice before the determination of whether a petition for the Chief Justice’s removal from office establishes a prima facie case.” It was further the contention of the Attorney General that, even if such a right existed, no law or precedent required that notice be given and response of the Chief Justice be sought before the petitions were transmitted to the Council of State. To the mind of the Author therefore, the contention of the Attorney General is that the contention of the Applicant is not expressly found in any law.

What was at stake here therefore was not a stay of execution in the strict sense of the word, there was no judgment or ruling which was sought to be stayed. It was an application to injunct the President from exercising powers constitutionally conferred on him by the law pending the determination of the action.

The Supreme Court in the voice of His Lordship Amadu Tanko had this to say, “That substantive action, as variously stated only provokes a determination of the constitutionality of whether the consultative processes for her removal had commenced in the absence of her comments or responses first obtained. If there is therefore any irreparable constitutional default which renders the entre process a nullity, no Judge bound by the oath of office and judicial oath must shy away from stating so in the fullness of time, In the circumstances of this application. I am not satisfied that, the threshold to warrant a suspension of the performance of the duties of the President under Article 146 of the Constitution, especially clause 10 thereof has been met.” His Lordship continued that, “…therefore under our constitutional dispensation, no person or entity, including the President of the Republic wields or exercises supreme authority immune from constitutional checks. As a country, we invested supremacy in the Constitution. What this simply means is that, every act, omission, conduct or inaction especially pertaining to the exercise of a public law function established by the Constitution must be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution for same to pass the test of validity.” At paragraph 54 of the judgment he stated that, “Recognising the danger to injunct or suspend a constitutional duty or power pendent lite, this court has stated the clearest legal position in a plethora of decisions that, same must be sparingly exercised with extreme circumspection unless there is a clear demonstration that, the case of the Applicant is invariably most likely to succeed for a permanent order of injunction to be made in the substantive suit. That is, there must be extreme exceptional necessity, in the interest of the state and the public at large, as a result of a clear and manifest conduct of constitutional infraction to warrant the court to grant an interlocutory injunction against the exercise of a constitutional function by no mean a person than the President in the exercise of the powers vested in him by the constitution pending the determination of a substantive matter.” After review of other cases his Lordship said, “Therefore the correct jurisprudence is that, the threshold to injunct the exercise of a constitutional or statutory function, duty, or discretion is not wishful thinking nor is it grounded on conjecturing political conspiracies. There must be sufficient demonstration that, the substantive action before the court is not frivolous, and must have been founded on a clear breach of the constitution or relevant statute. Of equal importance is that, the grant of the injunction pending final determination of the action will advance the public interest.”

Kulendi JSC on his part would express himself thus, “…While I acknowledge the utility and essence of the principle enunciated in the Moffat case supra, in preserving judicial authority and preventing the erosion of the potency of Court order by the overreaching preemptive activities of unscrupulous persons as well as frivolous and vexatious especially in private duties; I believe this case presents an opportunity to refine the application of this principle, especially in light of our contemporary constitutional realities. Instructively, our Constitution, unlike those of some jurisdiction, lack preliminary procedural filters at the Supreme Court to weed out frivolous cases before a hearing…….” At paragraphs 88 and 89 he continued that, “Without the introduction of useful nuance in the application of the Moffat principle to applications touching on constitutional duties, statutory bodies, public offices and functions; litigants could initiate baseless cases paired with frivolous injunction applications, with the sole intention of frustrating essential governmental functions. To judicially endorse the notion that a competent constitutional actor must consider their hands tied merely due to the service of an injunction application, particularly one that seeks to restrain or impede the execution of a crucial constitutional mandate, would risk paralyzing state functions and could lead to catastrophic consequences for our public and constitutional order.” His Lordship minded of his judicial oath further said that, “In good conscience and in fidelity to our judicial oath, we cannot endorse a position that could potentially be exploited by deliberate and well-resourced strategy deployed by individuals or entities pursuing parochial private interests to obstruct, delay and frustrate constitutional oversight and hold the public interest to ransom. In the premises, we find that, in cases involving the discharge of constitutionally or statutorily mandated functions by specifically designated actors, be they, statutory bodies, public offices or individuals empowered bylaw so to act, it would be utterly imprudent to adopt a blanket rule that mere service of an application for interlocutory injunction suffices to halt constitutional or statutory action which presumptively, would inure to the collective interest of the public.” He continued thus “We further hold that in such cases, nothing short of an express judicial grant of an injunction would suffice to restrain a constitutional or statutory duty bearer whose actions are presumptively in line with constitutional or lawful mandates. In fact the constitution itself envisages the continuous running of the Republic in article 64(2) with the declaration that even if this Court in a presidential election dispute declares as invalid the election of a president, such a declaration shall be without prejudice to anything done by the president before the declaration.” The Author suggests that there is no such express provision in the law regarding parliamentary election petitions. His Lordship Kulendi was not unmindful of the exigencies of some of these applications and would deliver himself in this manner, “We are not unmindful of the fact that certain matters may require immediate injunctive relief due to their time-sensitive nature. In such exceptional constitutional cases, the Supreme Court, given its critical constitutional role, can be empaneled to hear the application immediately, without delay. The Court’s unique mandate afterall, allows it to convene at anytime to address urgent matters of national significance, ensuring that constitutional order and continuity is maintained and potential irreparable harm to the constitutional order and public interest is averted”. In the Author’s view, the learning in the Assafuah case is not new relative to effect of the pendency of application for injunction in certain cases. In the case of Republic v High Court, Sekondi Ex Parte Perko II[53], the Court of Appeal[54] held inter alia that, “the mere filing of an application for an interim injunction seeking to restrain a chief from performing the functions of a chief would not operate to restrain him from performing the functions of his office when he had not been destooled and the court had not so ordered. Since a chief played key roles in the traditional set up a decision to the contrary would result in chaos and anarchy in the society by encouraging a chief’s detractors to bring frivolous actions against him and on applying for interim injunction, automatically compel him to cease to perform as a chief…”

The Author is of the humble view as stated elsewhere in this paper, that the learning in the Assafuah case that the mere filing of an application for interlocutory injunction does not stay the hands of a party is inapplicable to instances where the application is for stay of execution. There is no judicial authority that draws that distinction. Secondly, in the Assafuah case, the claim by the Applicant although factually disputed, is not expressly provided by the constitution as in the case of an election petition where a right of appeal is conferred by article 99(2) with the attendant possibility of staying execution. Thirdly, the Assafuah case was about an application for interlocutory injunction while what is at stake in the Kpandai case is about a stay of execution. The learning in the Assafuah case in the Author’s view is limited to interlocutory applications for injunctions and not stay of execution, it must also be considered in the light of the specific facts which is distinguishable from the facts in the Kpandai case and hence may not necessarily be applicable.

Contempt of Court; Clerk of Parliament and Electoral Commission.

Any attempt to bring disrepute to the judicial process is contemptuous. In the celebrated case of Republic v Moffat and Others, Ex Parte Allotey[55], the court said that “any conduct which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with any pending litigation is contempt of court. Once the respondent became aware of the pendency of the motion before the High Court, any conduct on their part which was likely to prejudice a fair hearing of that motion or interfere with the due administration of justice amounted to contempt.”[56] It has been held further by the Court of Appeal in the case of The Republic v Bank of Ghana and 5 Others (Ex Parte Benjamin Duffour)[57] that, “when during, or following the pendency of a matter before the court, a person scorns the orders of a court or disregard such pendency, the offence is against the court itself, for it brings its authority and the administration of law into disrespect, or in disregard.” The Court further said, “….But where there is no order by the Court to be obeyed, contempt of court may be constituted simply by conduct which interferes with the pending litigation” The High Court Tamale had made a determination which determination is being challenged. The effect of the challenge including stay of execution is that nothing is done in pursuance of the High Court Tamale no matter which law mandates an officer in this case the Clerk of Parliament to act. The vacancy as declared, pursuance to which the Clerk of Parliament acted under Article 112(5) is being challenged. The judicial vehicle has been triggered and once the Clerk of Parliament and Speaker were aware of the appeal, pendency of the application for stay of execution as well as the application before the Supreme Court for certiorari, no step could be taken under Article 112(5) of the 1992 Constitution in the humble view of the Author. In any case, the ruling of the Speaker regarding the seven-day automatic stay period is from the Court of Appeal Rules C.I 19, and it is that same C.I 19 that provides the jurisprudence of Stay of Execution and the effect of its filing, service and pendency. If the automaticity of the seven-day stay was observed, there is no reason known to law why the pendency of the formal application be ignored. In the view of the Author therefore, the Clerk of Parliament in purporting to notify the Electoral Commission of the vacancy when he knew as a matter of fact that an appeal and stay of execution had been filed and served on the Clerk of Parliament makes them candidates of contempt.

The Electoral Commission also went ahead to fix a date for the re-run of the by-election, knowing the pendency of the appellate processes and the stay of execution. In the Author’s view, the same principle supra applies to the Electoral Commission and it may also in contempt of the Court for proceeding to set a date for a re-run knowing very well that an appeal is pending together with a stay, which the result that the High Court decision will be overturned and that would mean the court would have been overreached and the decision of the Court of Appeal rendered nugatory. On their part, the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v Bank of Ghana and 5 Others (Ex Parte Benjamin Duffour)[58] speaking through Baffoe-Bonnie JSC (as he then was) thus, “The judicial power of Ghana, by article 125(3) of the 1992 Constitution, has been vested in the Judiciary. This power cannot be fettered by any person, agency, or organ including the President and Parliament. Any conduct that contravenes this provision is clearly unconstitutional and as such null and void. When a court is seized with jurisdiction to hear a matter, nothing should be done to usurp the judicial power that has been vested in the court by the Constitution of Ghana……A party to the proceedings will be in contempt if he engages in an act, subsequent to the filing of the case, which will have the effect of interfering with the fair hearing of the case or undermine the administration of justice…”

Is the embattled Member of Parliament persona non grata in Parliament?

It has been argued by the Majority Chief Whip in the Parliament of Ghana, Rockson-Nelson Etse Kwami Dafeamekpor[59] that Matthew Nyindam does not qualify to enter the Parliament house owing to the pronouncement by the Tamale High Court.[60] This position is baseless and without any legal merit. There is no legal justification for denying the said Member of Parliament from exercising his duty as MP when he has taken steps to challenge the process that declared his seat vacant through the legally acceptable mechanisms. The right of appeal in a parliamentary petition and stay of execution has been activated by the said member of Parliament. The declaration of vacancy is what has been appealed against and stayed. Once there is a stay that is pending, the status quo ante is what prevails. It is therefore incongruous for anyone much less lawyers, to argue otherwise. The Author suggests that once the stay is pending, the person cannot be prevented from performing his function as a member of Parliament until the application for stay of execution is dismissed and a repeat application also suffers the same fate even up to the Supreme Court.

Recommendations
The Author deems it apposite to make some recommendations on this subject matter to prevent the circumstances currently happening.

1. There should be special courts set up after every election designated as Election Petition Courts in all the regions. These courts will specifically deal with only election petition matters on a day-to-day basis with expedition. This way, such parliamentary election petitions are resolved quickly, and such challenges are given priority of hearing, such that an aggrieved party can go through the appellate processes quickly. At the appellate level such cases must be given priority so that the appellate processes do not last for the full term like happened in the case involving Honourable Isaac Amo.

2. It is also suggested that, anytime there is an election petition, with the advent of social media, parties involved and all stakeholders are likely to be aware of the pendency or commencement of such cases. Usually, parties for some reason may want to evade service, obviously because they know that the service of the processes on them have legal effect. In the Kpandai case for instance, after the filing of the certiorari application, the applicant had to approach the Supreme Court with an application to serve the Respondent by substituted service. Such applications are made when it is impossible or impracticable to serve the Respondent by personal service. In the Gyakye Quayson matter, it is a matter of public record that some Members of Parliament deliberately did all they could to ensure that Honourable Gyakye Quayson was not served with the Order of the High Court Cape Coast. Manasseh Azure Awuni narrates in his book, The President Ghana Never Got, in this regard thus “…By midday, when news broke that the high court in Cape Coast had ruled to stop Gyakye Quayson from being sworn in, the NDC got information that a bailiff was on his way to the Marriot Hotel to serve Mr. Quayson. One of the 15 MPs involved in the operation was tasked to sneak Mr. Quayson to the precincts of Parliament without being noticed. By this time, the military and other security intelligence agencies had taken control of that space. The forecourt of Parliament House would be the venue for the President’s swearing-in shortly after the parliamentary proceedings. The security officials searched and screened every vehicle that entered Parliament, but Mr. Quayson was sneaked into Muntaka’s office without being noticed. The NDC believed that part of the heightened security was to stop Mr. Quayson from entering the chamber. If that was true, then the NDC outwitted them. Gyakye Quuayson’s phone had been taken from him, so there was no way the bailiff could reach him…..[61]. In the Author’s view, if this is not curbed, and a cure found to it, other persons will always exploit approaches like this to evade being served court processes which will further delay the resolution of the dispute arising from the election petitions.

3. It would also be recommended that Parliament enact legislation or through its Standing Orders to deal with how it wants these matters to be dealt with if they take the view that there is a lacuna in the law.
4. There should also be specific timelines for dealing with matters of parliamentary election petitions and the decisions that emanate therefrom. If Parliamentary election petitions are left to follow the normal civil litigation procedure, chances are that by the time the High Court makes a determination, the person being challenged would have spent some time in Parliament and if he or she is removed, would be unjust to the victorious party who would as a consequence spend less than the four year term. It is suggested that laws can be enacted to the effect that such petitions must be dealt with within three months from the date of commencement and the appeal or any challenge should not exceed another three months after the determination sought to be challenged. This way, justice will be achieved and the successful person after the petition and subsequent judicial challenges is able to serve a major part of the term in parliament.
5. Serious consideration be given to the recommendation by the judiciary to amend the timelines for presentation of the election petition from twenty-one days after the publication in the gazette to about seven days after the declaration of the election results.[62] This will shorten the waiting period for the gazette notification before an election petition commences. Once amended, a person could present a petition within seven days after the declaration and have the matter resolved by a certain time before the end of the second quarter to enable the victor to give his or her constituents representation in parliament. In making these recommendations, His Lordship Paul Baffoe-Bonnie said that “We vote for people to go to parliament to go and represent our interest, so it is important that people are cleared to go and start work….” He continued thus, “By our constitution, the President has to appoint a certain number of parliamentarians as Minister…So the president must have the full complement of his MPs”[63]
6. Their Lordships given the opportunity may also make an express pronouncement on some of these matters to give directions as to the proper course in these matters and provide certainty for persons in doubt.

The above are by no means exhaustive as there may be other measures that can be implemented to resolve the challenges that arise as a result of the immediate aftermath of parliamentary election petitions.

Conclusion
From the above, the Author suggests that the law on stay of execution on Parliamentary election is clear, settled and admits no lacuna or uncertainty. When a stay of execution is filed and pending, the settled law is that nothing be done to overreach the court. Any such attempt may amount to contempt of the court, which must be avoided by all. It is unfortunate that people who know the settled position of the law in the name of politics from both divide pretend that the law is not settled. Lawyers who get the opportunity of representing their constituents in Parliament must be reminded that they have a four-fold duty as lawyers. It is gratifying that the apex court has suspended the rerun to abide the proceedings before their Lordships.

[1] Unreported Suit No. NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25

[2] https://radiotamaleonline.com/blog/2025/11/25/minority-caucus-rejects-high-court-ruling-on-kpandai-election-files-appeal/

[3] https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Dafeamekpor-backs-Tamale-High-Court-ruling-on-Kpandai-seat-rejects-Minority-falsehoods-2011774

[4] https://www.myjoyonline.com/afenyo-markin-slams-judiciary-says-judges-are-serving-paymasters-after-kpandai-election-annulment/

[5] https://www.myjoyonline.com/speaker-rules-matthew-nyindam-right-to-participate-in-parliament-amid-high-court-ruling/

[6] C.I 19

[7] C.I 132

[8] Rule 27(3) of C.I 19 as amended by Rule 1 of C.I 132

[9] Rule 27(3) of C.I 19 prior to the amendment by C.I 132

[10] https://www.myjoyonline.com/majority-moves-to-remove-nyindam-from-parliament-after-kpandai-election-annulment/

[11] https://www.myjoyonline.com/chaos-erupts-in-parliament-as-minority-storms-centre-of-floor-over-kpandai-seat-controversy/

[12] Article 99(1) of the 1992 Constitution

[13] P.N.D.C.L. 284

[14] Section 16(1) P.N.D.C.L. 284

[15] Section 16(2) P.N.D.C.L 284

[16] Section 17 P.N.D.C.L 284

[17] The Republic v High Court Koforidua, Ex Parte Dr. Kofi Asare, Baba Jamal Mohemmmed Ahmed and Mr Samuel Abrokwa as Interested Parties. Civil Motion No. J5/23/2009, Judgment dated 15^th July 2009.

[18] Suit No. J5/12/2009

[19] Section 18(3) P.N.D.C.L 284

[20] Section 18(2) P.N.D.C.L 284

[21] Civil Motion No. J5/23/2009 judgment dated 15^th July 2009

[22] Dictum of Julius Ansah J.S.C

[23] Section 19 of P.N.D.C.L 284

[24] Frimpong v Nyarko [1998-99] SCGLR 734

[25] Praka v Ketewa [1964] GLR 423

[26] Frimpong v Poku [1963] 2GLR 1 SC

[27] The Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex Parte Okai (2001-2002) SCGLR 545

[28] Rule 27(1) of C.I 19 as amended by C.I 132

[29] (1963) 1 G.L.R 387-392 SC

[30] Unreported Civil Appeal No. H3/20/2021 judgment dated 27^th October 2020

[31] Cora, S.K.A Asiedu JA, Domakyaareh (Mrs) J.A., Poku Acheampong

[32] Unreported Civil Motion No. J8/131/2019 judgment dated 28^th April 2020

[33] [2009-2010] SCGLR/ Civil Motion No. J5/43/2008 judgment delivered on 4^th February 2009

[34] Coram; Atuguba J.S.C Presiding, Ansah J.S.C, Owusu J.S.C, Anin Yeboah J.S.C, Baffoe-Bonnie J.S.C

[35] https://www.thelawplatform.online/post/mathew-nyindam-files-certiorari-application-at-the-supreme-court-to-quash-high-court-judgment

[36] https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ghana-news-suspend-kpandai-election-rerun-supreme-court-tells-ec.html

[37] https://ghanaiantimes.com.gh/supreme-court-halts-kpandai-parliamentary-re-run/

[38] Article 125 (3) of the 1992 Constitution

[39] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FWHYBxjb44Q

[40] Writ No. J1/18/2025 judgment dated 6^th May 2025

[41] [2009-2010] SCGLR/ Civil Motion No. J5/43/2008 judgment delivered on 4^th February 2009

[42] P.N.D.C. Law 284

[43] P.N.D. C Law 284

[44] Section 10

[45] Article 99 (1)

[46] Coram Wiredu C.J (Presiding), Acquah J.S.C, Akuffo J.S.C, Afreh J.S.C. Dr. Twum J.S.C

[47] [2003-2004] SCGLR 1

[48] C.I 19

[49] Rule 27 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules C.I 19 as amended.

[50] Rule 27(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules C.I 19 as amended

[51] Unreported Civil Appeal No. H3/20/2021 judgment dated 27^th October 2020

[52] Writ No. J1/18/2025 judgment dated 6^th May 2025

[53] [2001-2002] 2 GLR 460

[54] Coram Benin, Akoto Bamfo and Owusu Ansah JJA

[55] [1971] 2 GLR 391

[56] Abban J (as he then was)

[57] (2017) 113 G.M.J 156 CA

[58] [2018]123 G.M.J 205

[59] Honourable Member of Parliament, South Dayi Constituency

[60] https://www.myjoyonline.com/majority-moves-to-remove-nyindam-from-parliament-after-kpandai-election-annulment/

[61] Manasseh Azuri Awini, the President Ghana Never Got, page 223 - 224

[62] https://www.myjoyonline.com/parliamentary-election-petitions-judiciary-proposes-statutory-amendment-for-speedy-justice/

[63] https://www.myjoyonline.com/parliamentary-election-petitions-judiciary-proposes-statutory-amendment-for-speedy-justice/

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