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Civil–Military Imbalance and Political Power in Parts of Africa: A Case Study of Ghana

By Eric Paddy Boso
01 Dec 2025

Introduction
In many African states, civil–military relations are shaped by a persistent imbalance: political elites repeatedly benefit from natural resource wealth, procurement contracts, and institutional patronage — while the rank-and-file of the armed forces, despite their sacrifice and responsibilities, often experience stagnant wages, inadequate welfare, and poor living conditions. This imbalance undermines public trust in institutions, erodes morale within the military, and weakens the legitimacy of state authority over time.

This article examines this phenomenon using the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) as a case study; it situates Ghana within broader regional and historical patterns and explores how structural, institutional, and political factors converge to produce civil–military welfare disparities. The analysis draws on budget documents, public reporting, institutional data on military welfare (pension/provident funds), and comparative literature on African militaries and civil–military relations.

Key questions:
How does GAF compensation and welfare compare with the expectations associated with its duties and sacrifices?

What structural and institutional factors contribute to underinvestment in rank-and-file welfare while allowing political elites to capture resource flows?

What reform pathways could correct this imbalance without jeopardizing civilian oversight or state stability?

Literature Review & Theoretical Context

Foundational theories of civil–military relations emphasize the necessity of civilian supremacy over the military — through constitutional mechanisms, democratic control, institutional oversight and clear separation of military from political privilege. Claude E. Welch Jr.’s work (e.g. No Farewell to Arms?) remains a touchstone, arguing that even in transitions from coups to civilian rule, ensuring effective return of the military to barracks requires more than formal declarations — it depends on stable institutions, welfare guarantees, and credible oversight. Wikipedia+2OUP Academic+2

In the African context, recent scholarship documents how weak institutions, opaque resource governance, and politicization of defense spending create systemic civil–military imbalance. For instance, analyses of the Sahel region emphasize how military forces — under-paid yet politically powerful — exert outsized influence, undermining democratic civilian control and risking coups or authoritarian drift. Egmont Institute+1

In Ghana specifically, the historical trajectory of civil–military relations — including periods of coups, military rule, and democratization — highlights the fragile balance between ensuring military discipline and preserving civilian authority. EJLP Science+2The Free Library+2

However, less attention has been paid to military welfare and compensation (pay, housing, pension) as a structural pillar of civil–military stability. This study contributes to filling that gap by analyzing military welfare in empirical detail, and by linking welfare outcomes to broader resource governance and political structures.

Data and Methods

Limitations: official rank-by-rank take-home pay tables are not publicly released, so some salary bands come from aggregators or media; housing-quality data are indirect (budget lines, historical housing age, anecdotal reports). Thus findings should be treated cautiously — as part of a “best available evidence” approach, rather than definitive audited accounts.

Context: Military Welfare under GAF — Findings

The GAF Provident Fund: A structural welfare instrument

Since 2009, GAF has operated a Provident Fund (PF) intended as a pension/resettlement benefit for Officers and enlisted “Men.” As of December 2024, the Fund reportedly reached GHC 1,960,811,303.50 (up from GHC 400,000 at inception), suggesting institutionalization of long-term welfare planning within the forces. Ministry of Defence Ghana

However, participation (and effective benefit uptake) depends on contributions (5–35% of income for military personnel) and on financial literacy: ministry statements note that only a minority of personnel actively plan for retirement, and many retirees still depend on others for support. Ministry of Defence Ghana

Thus while the PF is a positive structural feature, its existence alone cannot offset immediate welfare deficits (low weekly/monthly pay, poor housing, allowances) — especially for enlisted and lower-ranked personnel.

Compensation, allowances, and living conditions

Incentives from external deployments (peacekeeping)

For many Ghanaian soldiers, participation in international peace-keeping missions offers some of the best opportunities for improved earnings and social mobility. Wages for such deployments are often far higher than domestic pay, and have historically allowed some soldiers to “buy homes, invest, start businesses” — opportunities they would otherwise lack. OUP Academic+1

However, reliance on such external deployment — intermittent, uncertain, sometimes politicized in selection — also creates inequalities within the force, where those with access to deployments disproportionately benefit.

Structural and Political Causes of Civil–Military Welfare Imbalance

Based on the Ghana case and comparative literature, several structural and political factors emerge as drivers of imbalance:

  1. Resource-flow opacity and elite capture — In resource-rich or resource-dependent economies, revenues from mining, commodities, timber, etc., often flow through political structures (contracts, procurement, licensing) before reaching state institutions. This centralization allows political elites to capture rents and privileges, reducing transparency and limiting funds available for uniform welfare distribution. This dynamic helps explain why military welfare may lag even when aggregate national wealth or defense budgets appear sizable.
  2. Budget prioritization: procurement over welfare — As noted in sector-spending studies, defense budgets often allocate disproportionately to procurement (hardware, equipment), leadership benefits, and capacity-building — areas that are politically visible and attract elite influence — while underinvesting in facilities, housing, and personnel welfare (especially for lower ranks). This pattern has been documented broadly in African militaries. Egmont Institute+1
  3. Institutional and oversight weaknesses — Civilian control over military budgets and welfare policies often exists in law but not in practice. Weak parliamentary oversight, opaque procurement and compensation systems, limited accountability frameworks, and weak unions or personnel associations mean that rank-and-file grievances rarely translate into policy pressure. Historical analyses of Ghana’s transitions show that absence of overt coups does not necessarily imply healthy civil–military relations — rather, latent inequalities and grievances can persist beneath the surface. The Free Library+2RSIS International+2
  4. Selective benefit flows via deployments and allowances — External deployments (e.g. peacekeeping) create additional income streams — but they tend to favor particular groups (those selected), producing internal inequality within the forces. This selective benefit distribution may foster internal factionalism, undermine cohesion, and increase grievances among those who are not deployed. OUP Academic+1
  5. Legacy structural inequalities (housing, colonial-era infrastructure) — Many military quarters and barracks date back decades (or to colonial periods), with insufficient modernization. Without investment in living conditions and family welfare (housing, schools, healthcare), compensation alone may not guarantee acceptable welfare standards. This undermines long-term morale and contributes to dissatisfaction. ManoReporters.com+1

Comparative Implications & Regional Relevance

Although this article focuses on Ghana, the pattern of civil–military welfare imbalance is not unique. In the Sahel and other parts of Africa, analyses show that weak civilian oversight and resource-driven elite enrichment correlate with recurrent coups, military overreach, and institutional instability. Egmont Institute+1

Recent empirical work on military spending and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa finds that military expenditure can contribute positively to growth — but crucially, only when institutional quality is strong. Where institutions are weak, increased spending tends to benefit elites and widen inequality rather than improve welfare broadly. SpringerLink

Thus, improving military welfare for rank-and-file — especially through transparent, institutionalized systems — is not simply a personnel issue; it is a stability and governance issue. A military that perceives itself as under-valued, while seeing elites benefit, is more likely to follow informal power channels, undercut civilian control, or become a source of institutional instability.

Policy Recommendations
Based on the evidence, I recommend a multi-pronged reform strategy for Ghana (and potentially other African states) aimed at restoring civil–military balance and improving welfare. Key elements:

Conclusion
This study demonstrates that civil–military imbalance in Africa — manifest not only in overt political power or coups, but also in deep welfare inequalities — remains a critical but under-examined dimension of governance. The Ghana Armed Forces, despite institutional welfare structures like the Provident Fund, continue to display significant gaps in pay, housing, and welfare, especially for enlisted and junior ranks.

Without reforms that prioritize transparency, equitable distribution, and institutional oversight, these structural imbalances risk undermining both military morale and civilian trust — with serious long-term implications for state stability, legitimacy, and social cohesion.

By framing military welfare as a core aspect of civil–military relations, policymakers, scholars, and civil society can better address the root causes of imbalance and build security institutions that are effective, fair, and accountable.

References

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Eric Paddy Boso is a spiritual researcher and visionary writer on a mission (SPIRITUAL AWAKENING OF HUMANITY) to awaken divine purpose in a distracted world. He exposes hidden systems, bridges ancient wisdom with modern truth, and speaks with the fire of alignment and awakening.

Disclaimer: "The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect ModernGhana official position. ModernGhana will not be responsible or liable for any inaccurate or incorrect statements in the contributions or columns here."

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