Re-Charting Ghana’s Democratic Path: Inclusion, Not Intimidation, in the Reset Era

Resetting Ghana’s democracy

Ghana stands tall as a democratic exemplar in Africa, celebrated for its smooth electoral transitions and institutional resilience. Yet beneath this surface, a persistent undercurrent undermines those strengths: party-aligned vigilante groups. The Azorka Boys, linked to the NDC, and Delta Force or Invincible Forces, aligned with the NPP, have repeatedly disrupted election cycles. Though outlawed by the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999), these formations continue to cast a long shadow over our democracy.

Since his inauguration on 7 January 2025, President John Dramani Mahama has rightly framed his return as “a unique opportunity to reset Ghana”, renewing faith in institutions, governance, and the citizen-state compact. As he presses forward, it is vital that this reset be anchored in a firm repudiation of partisan vigilantism. Peaceful political competition, not muscle-flexing, must define the next chapter of Ghanaian electoral democracy.

Vigilantism’s Roots in Ghanaian Politics

Politically-linked vigilante groups are far from relics of the past. In the early 2000s, the NPP’s Invincible Forces were ubiquitous at rallies and polling stations, often serving as unofficial enforcers. Infamously, the Delta Force stormed a Kumasi court in 2017 to free members standing trial for assault. The spectacle exposed both the state’s authority and its limitations.

For its part, the NDC’s Azorka Boys, loyal to Chief Sofo Azorka, have played a similar role in the Northern Region. Especially during contested elections, their mobilisation in Tamale and environs has become a fixture, raising concerns about political intimidation and impunity.

These groups illustrate how both major parties, at various times, have encouraged or tolerated vigilante formations. Behind public denials of violence, shadowy loyalties persist, suggesting that intimidation is still seen as a political tool when stakes are high.

The Akwatia by-election

The most recent and vivid example of vigilantism corrupting politics occurred during the Akwatia by-election. Following the death of the NPP MP Ernest Kumi, electoral tension escalated. Reports emerged that Alhaji Sofo Azorka openly threatened NPP’s Alexander Afenyo-Markin, and that his entourage, the “Azorka Boys” clashed with NPP officials at the local lorry station. Disturbingly, it is alleged that they attempted to physically assault the NPP’s regional vice-chair, Alhaji Osman Masawudu, in full view of police.

Despite these disturbances, the election proceeded, with the NDC’s Bernard Baidoo ultimately winning the seat. Yet the process was marred, not by ballots, but by the spectre of party-aligned intimidation. Such incidents, rather than demonstrating strength, betray democratic weakness and institutional failure.

The democratic toll of vigilante politics

The price of political vigilantism in Ghana is steep, and it touches every aspect of our democratic life. Perhaps the most serious consequence is the erosion of public trust in elections. When ordinary citizens approach the ballot box in an atmosphere clouded by the presence of party foot soldiers, they are left wondering whether their votes will truly be protected by the impartial hand of the law, or instead overshadowed by intimidation. Democracy depends upon confidence in the idea that each vote counts equally. Vigilantism undermines this very foundation by introducing fear as a factor in political participation.

A second cost lies in the cycle of retaliation that vigilante activity generates. One party’s reliance on militant youth groups inevitably invites a response from its rival. The violent raid by the NPP-affiliated Delta Force on a Kumasi court in 2017, or the repeated mobilisation of the NDC’s Azorka Boys in the north, each provoked a counter-narrative that justified further mobilisation on the opposite side.

Rather than creating security, these actions feed into a spiral of reprisal and escalation. The recent by-election in Akwatia demonstrated this all too clearly: when the Azorka Boys clashed with NPP officials at the lorry station, the incident did not remain an isolated scuffle but was read by both parties as evidence of the other’s bad faith, fuelling even greater hostility.

A third, and no less damaging, effect of vigilantism is its corrosive impact on institutions. Whenever political leaders bypass the police or the Electoral Commission and instead call upon their “boys” to enforce order or protect polling stations, they signal to the public that state institutions cannot be trusted. This not only weakens the credibility of those bodies in the immediate moment but erodes their long-term authority.

If the police appear unable or unwilling to restrain vigilante actors, then the monopoly of legitimate force that defines a functioning state is compromised. Ghana has invested decades in building resilient democratic institutions, yet their authority is steadily hollowed out each time a party militia steps into the role that should properly belong to law enforcement and the courts.

Taken together, these costs place Ghana’s democracy in jeopardy. They do not erase the proud gains of peaceful transitions and spirited electoral competition, but they gnaw at the edges, threatening to normalise coercion where persuasion should reign.

The reset politics now being pursued by President Mahama offers an opportunity to address this menace directly, but it will only succeed if the nation acknowledges just how corrosive vigilantism has already become to Ghana’s democratic life.

Pathways to democratic renewal

For Ghana’s reset to be credible, tackling partisan vigilantism must be central. This is not merely a legal imperative but a political and ethical one.

The first step must be the impartial enforcement of Act 999. Too often, enforcement appears selective, with one party’s groups prosecuted while the other’s are quietly tolerated. The law must be applied consistently, with transparent prosecutions and clear penalties, including the disqualification of candidates found to sponsor or deploy vigilantes. Only impartial enforcement can break the perception that vigilantism pays.

Equally important is internal party discipline. Both the NDC and NPP must take responsibility for their own members who fraternise with outlawed groups. This means imposing sanctions such as suspension, removal from leadership roles, or outright expulsion on party officials who are found to sponsor, protect, or defend vigilante networks. A political reset cannot succeed if parties turn a blind eye to their own infractions while condemning those of their rivals.

The youth who join vigilante groups must also be offered alternative pathways. Many young people are drawn into these networks not out of ideology but because of unemployment, poverty, and the promise of patronage. Reintegrating them into society requires more than banning their groups. It demands training programmes, employment schemes, and civic education that redirect their energies into constructive service.

For example, young people who once served as “party security” could be trained as accredited election marshals under the supervision of the Electoral Commission and police, transforming them from a source of fear into agents of peace.

The integrity of electoral administration must also be reinforced. The Electoral Commission should continue to streamline processes, strengthen polling station security through neutral forces, and increase transparency in vote collation. When election administration is consistent and trustworthy, parties have less incentive to rely on informal protectors.

Finally, it is crucial to empower the Ghana Police Service to maintain vigilance and order during electoral events. Their disciplined presence can serve as a symbol of institutional strength and impartial enforcement, assuring citizens that the state alone is responsible for security and that political competition can unfold without fear.

Why this must be central to Mahama’s reset

President Mahama’s reset is about rebuilding trust, revitalising institutions, and restoring hope. But that reset rings hollow if democracy remains under threat of muscle.

By firmly rejecting partisan vigilantism, not just in speech but in action, the presidency can reclaim moral high ground. It would demonstrate that the NDC stands for a politics of ideas and inclusion, not intimidation.

Moreover, this bold stance would help break the cycle of violence before it metastasises. Ghana could begin to export a model of peaceful, inclusive democratic renewal, something far more enduring than any temporary political triumph.

Democracy by will, not force

Ghana’s democracy thrives on spirited debate, civic engagement, and transparent institutions. But these pillars are hollowed when politics is enforced through fear and force. The Akwatia by-election reminded the nation that vigilantism still lurks in the corridors of power, even as we pride ourselves on progress.

If Mahama’s reset is to be more than rhetoric, it must root out the culture of vigilantism and replace it with inclusion, accountability, and the rule of law. Let Ghana emerge not just as a democracy, but as a democracy that defies its challengers with ballots, not bullets.

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