Ablekuma North Violence Echoes Ayawaso: Ghana’s Recurring Spectre Of Election Day Brutality

ABSTRACT

The 11th July 2025 parliamentary rerun in Ablekuma North Constituency represents more than an isolated security failure; it signifies Ghana’s institutionalised cycle of electoral violence. This article employs comparative analysis to expose striking operational, tactical, and political parallels between the Ablekuma incident and the 2019 Ayawaso West Wuogon by-election violence. Drawing on eyewitness footage, party statements, security reports, and historical data, the author argues that Ghana’s democratic stability is jeopardised by three recurrent pathologies: State-affiliated Perpetrator Impunity, Intelligence Architecture Collapse, and Political Weaponisation of Justice. The study concludes with evidence-based security reforms to break this destructive pattern.

INTRODUCTION

Analysis of a Recurring Crisis

The assault on former MP Hawa Koomson at Odorkor Methodist Church on 11th July 2025, captured in viral videos showing her being ‘stomped, kicked, and dragged’ by coordinated assailants, was not a spontaneous anomaly. Rather, it constitutes the latest manifestation of Ghana’s entrenched electoral violence pathology. The Ablekuma North rerun, occurring just six years after the Ayawaso West Wuogon shootings (31st January 2019), demonstrates near-identical modus operandi despite differing political administrations:

“Both episodes featured state-linked armed groups, police inertia, high-profile female targets (MPs and candidates), and immediate partisan blame-trading that obstructed accountability” (Academia.edu., 2020; MyJoyOnline., 2025).

This analysis adopts Professor Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi’s conceptual framework of “Electoral violence as institutionalised party strategy” to decode systemic failures. By examining perpetrator profiles, security responses, and post-violence political narratives, it only reveal hows electoral brutality unfortunately has become normalised within the democratic culture of Ghana.

2. HISTORICAL PARALLELS: AYAWASO (2019) AND ABLEKUMA (2025)

  1. Perpetrator Profile and Tactics
    1. Ayawaso (2019): Masked national security operatives in black polo shirts, armed with pistols and assault rifles, stormed the La Bawaleshie Presbyterian School polling station. They shot 18 NDC supporters, including MP Sam George’s brother.
    2. Ablekuma (2025): Men in “Brown security uniforms”, later confirmed as impersonators, attacked St. Peter’s Society Methodist Church polling station. They targeted NPP’s Deputy National Organiser Chris Lloyd Nii Kwei Asamoah, pinning him down for kicking and punching while similarly assaulting parliamentary candidate Nana Akua Afriyie .

Commonality: Non-police armed groups with state aesthetic (uniforms/vehicles) executing coordinated strikes.

  1. Security Force Response
    1. Ayawaso: Police stood by as national security operatives fired live rounds. The Emile Short Commission confirmed “Excessive force” but noted police claimed “No operational control” over perpetrators.
    2. Ablekuma: Officers “Adjusted berets while chaos reigned” during the assault on Hawa Koomson. One officer slapped journalist Kwabena Agyekum Banahene to prevent filming .

Commonality: Law enforcement complicity through inaction or active obstruction of evidence gathering.

  1. Political Aftermath
    1. Ayawaso: NDC labelled it “State-sponsored terror”; NPP dismissed it as “Isolated misconduct.” No prosecutions occurred despite commission recommendations.
    2. Ablekuma: NPP’s Bawumia condemned “NDC-orchestrated violence”; NDC’s Sam George retorted: “What did Bawumia say about Ayawaso?”.

Commonality: Mutual recrimination weaponising past violence to deflect present accountability.

Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Electoral Violence Incidents

Dimension Ayawaso West Wuogon (2019) Ablekuma North (2025)
Perpetrators National Security SWAT team “Brown uniform” impersonators
Weapons Used Firearms (18 shot) Fists/feet, pepper spray
Primary Targets NDC supporters NPP officials (Koomson, Afriyie, Asamoah)
Police Action Passive observation Delayed response; journalist assault
Judicial Outcome Zero prosecutions Investigations announced (status pending)

3. RECURRING PATHOLOGIES IN GHANA’S ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

A. Pathology 1: Intelligence Architecture Collapse

Ghana’s security apparatus has repeatedly failed to detect or prevent planned attacks despite clear indicators:

Security analyst Richard Kumadoe attributes this to “Political contamination of intelligence priorities,” where electoral security is sacrificed to avoid “inconveniencing ruling elites”.

B. Pathology 2: Gendered Political Targeting

Female politicians face disproportionate brutality, signalling deliberate intimidation tactics:

This pattern weaponises gender to deter women’s political participation, a trend documented by CDD-Ghana since 2020 .

C. Pathology 3: Media Suppression Playbook

Journalists covering violence face systematic obstruction:

Table 2: Evolution of Violence-Enabling Conditions (2019–2025)

Enabling Condition Ayawaso (2019) Ablekuma (2025) Escalation Factor
Perpetrator Impunity 100% non-prosecution Ongoing investigations Institutionalised norm
Party Militia Activity Invigilante groups Rebranded “Security aides” +300% recruitment
Voter Disenfranchisement 1,500 prevented from voting 19 stations disrupted Geographic spread ↑
International Response US “Concern” statement US visa ban threats Diplomatic pressure ↑

4. STAKEHOLDER ACCOUNTABILITY AUDIT

A. Political Parties: Systemic Hypocrisy

Academic verdict: Both parties instrumentalise violence when electorally expedient.

B. Security Institutions: Structural Complicity

C. Electoral Commission (EC)

EC’s security planning ignored CDD-Ghana’s 2024 warning about Ablekuma North’s “High volatility risk”. No contingency existed for uniformed infiltrators.

5. BREAKING THE CYCLE: EVIDENCE-BASED SECURITY REFORMS

A. Immediate Measures

  1. Electoral Integrity Task Force (EITF) Institution
    • Composition: It must be composed of Interpol-trained investigators, judiciary representatives.
    • Mandate: The EITF must be mandated to gather evidence of post-violence with 72 hours; Also, it must be mandated to freez assets of named instigators.
  1. Biometric Security Tagging
    • NFC-enabled police badges linked to EC database to identify impersonators.

B. Medium-Term Institutional Reforms

  1. Vigilantism Act Enforcement Unit (VAEU): Financial forensics must be instituted to trace party payments to militias as well as prosecute financiers under Act 999.
  2. Gender-Responsive Security Protocols: A dedicated protection units for female candidates must be established while misogynistic violence are classified as electoral terrorism.

C. International Leverage Mechanisms

  1. Global Magnify Sanctions: Publish names of violence instigators for US/EU asset freezes.
  2. ECOWAS Court Fast-Tracking: Prioritise electoral violence cases; rulings within six months.

CONCLUSION

Democratic Survival Beyond the Spectre

The Ablekuma-Ayawaso nexus reveals Ghana’s electoral violence as a learned behaviour refined across election cycles. As CDD-Ghana notes: “Impunity is the oxygen sustaining this fire. Footage of Koomson’s assault, reminiscent of Ayawaso’s bloodied victims, proves institutional memory has bred perpetrator confidence, not reform.

GHANA STANDS AT A PRECIPICE: TOLERATE ANOTHER SIX-YEAR VIOLENCE CYCLE OR ENFORCE THE VIGILANTISM ACT WITHOUT PARTISAN FAVOUR. THE 2028 ELECTIONS WILL EITHER CEMENT GHANA’S DEMOCRATIC EXCEPTIONALISM OR CONFIRM ITS DESCENT INTO COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM. AS CONCERNED CITIZENS WHO WOULD NOT WANT TO BE SPECTATORS, WE MUST CHOOSE ACCOUNTABILITY OVER ALLEGIANCE. THE SPECTRE MUST BE EXORCISED, NOT ENDURED.

REFERENCES

Dr. Collins Tetteh Abeni, was the Acting Registrar of Offinso College of Education, combining leadership in academia with Methodist ministry. He holds a PhD in Educational Leadership and professional certifications as a Chartered Management Consultant (CMC) and Chartered Administrator (ChPA). An exp

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