ECOWAS Sanctions and the Alliance of Sahel States: A New Power Struggle?

In recent years, the Sahel region has become a focal point of political instability and security challenges, marked by the rise of insurgent movements, military coups, and deteriorating state governance. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional bloc of 15 member states, has played a central role in addressing these crises, often through the imposition of sanctions and mediation efforts. However, the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (L'Alliance des États du Sahel) (AES) – a new bloc comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger – has introduced a potential counterweight to ECOWAS’s influence in the region. This analysis explores the recent power struggle (or perceived power struggle) between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States, particularly in the context of ECOWAS sanctions, and evaluates the broader implications for regional stability, governance, and cooperation.

1. Background: ECOWAS’s Role in West African Stability

ECOWAS was established in 1975 with the primary goal of fostering economic integration among West African countries. However, over time, its role has expanded to include peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and the promotion of democracy. In the context of political instability, particularly caused by military coups, ECOWAS has often responded with sanctions and diplomatic pressure to restore constitutional order. For instance, in response to the military coups in Mali (August 18, 2020), Burkina Faso (September 30, 2022), and Niger (July 26, 2023), ECOWAS imposed a series of economic and financial sanctions, including border closures, the suspension of financial assistance, and the freezing of assets. These sanctions are part of ECOWAS’s broader policy of rejecting unconstitutional changes in government, as outlined in its Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. ECOWAS views these measures as essential for maintaining regional stability and preventing the normalization of military rule.

2. The Formation of the Alliance of Sahel States

In the wake of these coups, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger – three Sahelian countries that have experienced military takeovers – formed the Alliance of Sahel States on September 16, 2023. This alliance is intended to strengthen cooperation among the three nations, particularly in addressing security threats posed by insurgent groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates operating in the Sahel. However, the alliance also represents a clear political statement: a rejection of external interference, especially by ECOWAS and Western powers like France, which have historically influenced the region’s political and security affairs. The creation of the alliance coincided with several challenges facing the Sahelian regional and international collaborations. For instance, the once highly heralded G5 Sahel Joint Force has been on the verge of disintegrating following Mali’s withdrawal in 2022. A series of decisions and events have impeded cooperation with European partners as well. These include the denunciation by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger of many defence agreements with Paris and the subsequent withdrawal of French troops from these countries. For over a decade, France had coordinated both regional and international initiatives to combat violent extremism and insecurity in the Sahel.

The alliance was formed at a time when ECOWAS was threatening to use force to facilitate Niger's return to constitutional rule after General Abdourahmane Tchiani’s-led coup d'état. Hence, a major contributing factor in the formation of the new coalition was ECOWAS’s threats to launch a military intervention in Niger at the behest of western powers. What then would the relationship between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States be? Indeed, it’s too early to say for certain how the future dynamics would play out. This also holds true for the alliance’s ties to other programs like the Accra Initiative and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. For the time being, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are locked in a multifaceted political impasse with ECOWAS.

Nonetheless, the formation of the alliance signals a broader shift in regional dynamics. It challenges the hegemony of ECOWAS and suggests that a new axis of power is emerging, rooted in military-led governments that reject the traditional norms of constitutional democracy championed by ECOWAS. The three-member states of the alliance have explicitly expressed their opposition to the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS, claiming that these measures undermine their sovereignty and complicate efforts to address the pressing security concerns in the region. Is it also the case of showing me your friend for me to tell you your character? After severing military and diplomatic ties with long-standing regional allies and Western powers, the three states have fostered closer diplomatic, defence, and commercial ties with Russia. Of course, this was to be expected. A Russian jet was said to have sent Russian military trainers and equipment, including an air defense system, to the capital city of Niamey on Wednesday, April 10, 2024. This had signaled the start of a fresh partnership between the military authorities of Niger and the Kremlin. After the arrival of Russian military advisers and equipment, hundreds of demonstrators rallied in Niamey to call for the removal of US soldiers. It is worth noting that Niger has served as the focal point of US military activities in West and North Africa since the two states inked a military agreement in 2012. Therefore, the formation of AES and subsequence strengthening of ties with Russia are not only a rection of democracy and the so-called dictates of ECOWAS but also a diplomatic slap in the face of the United States.

Member States of the Alliance of Sahel States. Source: Lagos to the World

3. ECOWAS Sanctions and Their Impact
ECOWAS sanctions have had a significant impact on the economies and political landscapes of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. For example, after the 2020 coup in Mali, ECOWAS imposed a range of sanctions, including financial and economic blockades, which severely disrupted trade and exacerbated economic hardship. Similar measures were applied to Burkina Faso following its 2022 coup and to Niger after the 2023 coup. The rationale behind these sanctions is to pressure military regimes to return to civilian rule, which is in line with ECOWAS’s commitment to upholding democratic governance in the region. However, the effectiveness of these sanctions has been questioned. Military leaders have often remained defiant, prolonging their grip on power despite the economic consequences for their populations.

Critics argue that the sanctions disproportionately affect ordinary citizens while the military elites remain relatively insulated from their effects. This has led to growing resentment toward ECOWAS in the sanctioned countries, with some citizens perceiving the organization as an external actor imposing undue hardship rather than as a partner for peace and development. It was therefore refreshing to read that after several seemingly failed sanctions in Guinea, Mali, and Niger, leaders of ECOWAS have decided to do a diplomatic introspection. At an emergency meeting held on Sunday, February 25, 2024, in Abuja, Nigeria, ECOWAS decided to remove most of the sanctions placed on Bamako, Conakry, and Niamey after the military’s ouster of the elected presidents between 2020 and 2023. These trade, political, and economic sanctions were primarily intended to compel the military to schedule elections in a timely manner. The sanctions have so far failed to yield the desired results.

To add insult to the ECOWAS injury, rumors are not in short supply that some states in the sub-region may be readying their diplomatic horses to join the members of the alliance. To strengthen commercial ties, AES has extended an invitation to Togo to attend a meeting of Customs Directors General held in Niamey, Niger, on Tuesday, July 23. At the said meeting, customs officers from AES member nations agreed to interconnect their customs systems with Togo, which they deemed very essential to facilitate regional trade. They gave their technology teams instructions to create a networked customs section within the AES. The director general of customs for Burkina Faso, Adama Ilboudo, said that these actions will enhance transit management and ease cross-border trade, thereby strengthening relations with Togo. This initiative was undertaken during a difficult period for the region, especially considering the economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on the three Sahelian governments with military regimes. Togo has intensified its attempts to fortify commercial links with its neighbors after these sanctions and the closing of the borders between Benin and Niger, a move many analysts are observing closely.

4. The Power Struggle Between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States

The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States marks the emergence of a new power struggle in West Africa. On one side, ECOWAS seeks to maintain its role as the primary arbiter of political and security issues in the region, promoting democracy, good governance, and regional integration. On the other side, the AES, led by military governments, represents a rejection of ECOWAS’s authority and an assertion of sovereignty in response to what they perceive as external interference. The involvement of Russia in the entire diplomatic uproar is making the power dynamics quite complicated. The Russian scenario will be analyzed extensively at the appropriate forum.

4.1. Sovereignty vs. Regionalism
One of the key issues in this power struggle is the tension between national sovereignty and regionalism. The Alliance of Sahel States frames its opposition to ECOWAS sanctions as a defense of national sovereignty, emphasizing the right of its member states to determine their own political futures without external pressure. In contrast, ECOWAS champions the principles of regional cooperation and collective security, arguing that instability in one state can spill over into neighboring countries, threatening the entire region.

This debate reflects a broader question in international relations: how to balance state sovereignty with the need for regional and international governance structures that promote stability and cooperation. The Alliance’s challenge to ECOWAS’s authority raises concerns about the future of regional integration and governance in West Africa, as it suggests that some states are no longer willing to accept ECOWAS’s leadership on political matters.

4.2. Security Cooperation
The security dimensions of this power struggle are also significant. The Sahel region is one of the most volatile in the world, plagued by insurgent violence or violent extremism, terrorism, and trafficking. While ECOWAS has traditionally played a role in regional security efforts, the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States signals a desire for these countries to take more control over their own security strategies. The Alliance has proposed joint military operations to combat terrorism, which could further reduce reliance on external actors such as France or ECOWAS.

However, the divergence between ECOWAS and the Alliance on security matters raises concerns about the effectiveness of regional security cooperation. If the Alliance prioritizes its own security agenda over broader ECOWAS-led initiatives, it could fragment regional efforts to combat terrorism and insurgency, making it harder to coordinate a unified response to these challenges.

5. Implications for Regional Stability and Governance

The power struggle between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States has significant implications for the future of regional stability and governance in West Africa.

5.1. Weakening of ECOWAS Authority
The Alliance’s defiance of ECOWAS sanctions and its rejection of the organization’s authority could weaken ECOWAS’s ability to enforce its norms and standards, particularly regarding democracy and governance. If the Alliance is successful in maintaining its stance against ECOWAS, it could embolden other countries in the region to challenge the organization’s authority, undermining its role as the leading regional body for West Africa.

5.2. Fragmentation of Regional Efforts

The emergence of the Alliance also risks fragmenting regional efforts to address common challenges such as security, development, and governance. By creating a parallel bloc that operates outside the ECOWAS framework, the Alliance may sabotage efforts to coordinate policies on these issues. This fragmentation could weaken the collective ability of West African states to respond to shared threats, such as terrorism and economic instability, which require coordinated, region-wide solutions.

The head of Niger’s ruling military junta, General Abdourahmane Tiani, spoke on February 11, 2024, of the possible creation of a common currency within member-states of the AES. This is seen as a first step toward breaking from the legacy of colonization and external influence. If these military rulers succeed where ECOWAS, after years of struggle, has failed to actualize the ECO initiative, that will further exacerbate the credibility deficit ECOWAS has suffered in recent years.

5.3. Impact on Democracy and Governance

The power struggle between ECOWAS and the Alliance raises broader questions about the future of democracy and governance in the region. ECOWAS has positioned itself as a defender of constitutional democracy, but the emergence of the Alliance, comprised of military regimes, suggests that a significant portion of the region is moving away from this model. If the Alliance gains influence, it could signal a shift toward a more authoritarian form of governance in parts of West Africa, with potential implications for human rights, political freedoms, and regional stability.

Conclusion
The power struggle between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States represents a critical juncture for the future of regional cooperation and governance in West Africa. While ECOWAS has long been the dominant force in promoting democracy and stability in the region, the emergence of the Alliance challenges this role, reflecting deeper tensions over sovereignty, governance, and security. As the Sahel continues to grapple with political instability and security threats, the ability of regional organizations to work together (or compete) will shape the future of the region. Ultimately, resolving this power struggle will require dialogue and compromise, as well as a recognition that the challenges facing the Sahel and West Africa are too great to be addressed by any single bloc or actor.

Bibliography
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Acknowledgement
This article has benefited tremendously from the expert advice of Col. Joseph Kelvin Merdiemah of the Ghana Armed Forces, who has expertise on the operations of the regional bloc, ECOWAS.

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