Ghana And Brics: Cabinet's Approval, The Imf–world Bank Question And The Future Of Africa's Economic Independence

If Ghana has spent decades seeking assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, why does the country still struggle with debt, unemployment, industrialisation and economic vulnerability? Could BRICS offer a different path or will it become another powerful club where African countries provide resources while others reap the greatest rewards?

Ghana’s reported Cabinet approval of a decision to join BRICS opens a debate that goes far beyond diplomacy. It raises fundamental questions about the future of Ghana’s economy, the effectiveness of the international financial system, the legacy of Western economic influence in Africa and whether the continent can finally negotiate its development on more favourable terms.

For decades, African governments have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for financial assistance, economic stabilisation, development loans and technical support. Yet many African countries continue to struggle with high debt burdens, inadequate infrastructure, weak manufacturing sectors, currency depreciation and dependence on exporting raw materials.

Now, as the global economic order becomes increasingly multipolar, BRICS presents itself as an alternative platform for cooperation among emerging economies.

But let us be clear from the beginning: joining BRICS is not the same as escaping debt, and criticising the IMF and World Bank does not mean every BRICS policy is automatically better. The real question is whether Ghana can use this new diplomatic opening to secure better financing, expand its industrial base, protect its economic sovereignty and create measurable improvements in the lives of ordinary citizens.

And if Ghana joins, the country must ask a question that African governments have too often failed to answer convincingly: What exactly will the Ghanaian people gain, and how will we know when they have gained it?

5\. The IMF and World Bank: What were they created to do?

To understand why BRICS appeals to African countries, we must first understand the institutions that have shaped international development finance for more than 80 years.

The IMF and the World Bank emerged from the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, held towards the end of the Second World War.

The IMF was established primarily to promote international monetary cooperation, exchange-rate stability and balance-of-payments support. It later became a central source of emergency financing for countries experiencing financial crises.

The World Bank, initially focused on post-war reconstruction, developed into a major provider of development finance for infrastructure, education, healthcare, agriculture, public administration and poverty reduction.

They are different institutions, even though they frequently work together.

The IMF typically becomes particularly influential when a country faces a fiscal crisis, severe foreign-exchange shortages or an unsustainable external financing position. The World Bank generally concentrates on longer-term development and institutional reform, although its financing instruments and programmes vary.

Their contributions to development should not be dismissed. They have financed essential infrastructure, supported public health and education, provided economic expertise and helped countries respond to crises.

However, their record also raises difficult questions about conditionality, the distribution of decision-making power and whether stabilisation programmes consistently translate into lasting improvements in people's lives.

For Ghana, these questions are not theoretical. The country has repeatedly experienced economic difficulties and sought international assistance.

The central issue is not whether the IMF or World Bank should exist. It is whether the global financial system offers countries such as Ghana a fair, effective and sustainable path to development.

6\. Why are African countries looking beyond the IMF and World Bank?

It is important not to claim that most African countries are abandoning these institutions. There is no basis for treating every African government's engagement with BRICS as a decision to leave the IMF or World Bank.

Ghana's own stated position is to maintain existing partnerships while adding new ones.

Nevertheless, interest in alternative financing reflects real frustrations.

A. Debt repayment can crowd out development

Governments that borrow to build infrastructure must eventually repay principal and interest. When debt servicing becomes too expensive, less money may remain for hospitals, schools, agricultural support, water systems and job creation.

A Financial Times report published on 9 October 2026, drawing on UN Trade and Development figures, reported that net interest payments consumed 15.7% of government revenue in sub-Saharan Africa in 2024, more than twice the average for developing countries excluding China. It also highlighted the increase in borrowing costs between 2020 and 2024.

These figures describe a regional problem, not Ghana's individual debt-service ratio. But they illustrate why the cost of borrowing matters so much.

The uncomfortable question: If a country spends an enormous share of its revenue servicing debt, how much genuine development freedom does it retain?

And if debt-funded development does not generate sufficient economic returns to repay the loans, who bears the ultimate cost—the original lenders, the political leaders who borrowed, or the citizens who pay taxes and experience cuts to public services?

B. Economic conditionality and national sovereignty

IMF programmes can require governments to undertake fiscal consolidation, strengthen revenue collection, reform public enterprises, reduce certain subsidies or change monetary and exchange-rate policies. The precise conditions differ from programme to programme.

Supporters argue that such measures can restore confidence, address macroeconomic imbalances and prevent a crisis from becoming worse.

Critics argue that aggressive spending cuts or rapid reforms can impose heavy short-term costs on households, public-sector workers and vulnerable communities, particularly where social protections are inadequate.

The debate should not be reduced to the simplistic claim that every IMF condition is harmful or that every government decision made without IMF involvement would be better.

The more important question is whether the design and sequencing of reforms are appropriate for a country's circumstances.

Why, for example, should a country facing an economic crisis be judged only by its fiscal deficit, inflation and debt trajectory, rather than also by employment, food security, industrial output and the resilience of public services?

Can a programme be considered successful if macroeconomic indicators improve but ordinary citizens continue to struggle with affordable housing, reliable electricity, decent jobs and access to quality healthcare?

C. The unequal power of countries in global financial institutions

The IMF and World Bank are multilateral institutions, but their governance arrangements do not give every country equal voting power.

Voting influence is substantially linked to financial quotas or shareholding. Wealthier economies consequently exercise greater influence than many developing countries.

This creates a legitimate debate about representation.

African countries may be independent sovereign states, but independence does not automatically give them equal influence over the rules governing international finance.

If African countries collectively account for a substantial share of the world's population and natural resources, why is their influence in the institutions that shape global development finance not proportional to their development needs?

And if the rules of an international financial system are partly shaped by the countries with the greatest financial power, how can poorer countries be certain that their own long-term industrial interests receive adequate consideration?

These are not arguments for rejecting international cooperation. They are arguments for making it more representative.

D. The raw-material trap
Consider the structure of many African economies.

A country may export gold, cocoa, bauxite, manganese, crude oil or agricultural commodities, then import refined products, machinery, pharmaceuticals, electronics and industrial equipment.

The country earns money from its resources but may capture only a limited share of the value generated by processing, manufacturing, branding, logistics and distribution.

This is one of the most consequential questions in Africa's development debate.

Why have decades of development financing not resulted in sufficiently broad-based industrial transformation across the continent?

The answer cannot honestly be placed entirely at the feet of the IMF and World Bank. Colonial economic structures, domestic political choices, corruption, weak infrastructure, global market conditions, conflict, poor policy implementation and external shocks all matter.

Yet international development institutions should also be judged on whether their policies and financing have helped countries overcome structural dependence rather than simply manage it.

If African countries continue to borrow to finance development while exporting the raw materials that could finance their industrialisation, at what point does development assistance become a system for managing dependence rather than ending it?

That question deserves an evidence-based answer from African governments and international lenders alike.

### 7\. BRICS versus the IMF and World Bank: Which offers Ghana more?

The comparison requires care. BRICS is primarily a political and economic cooperation grouping, while the IMF is a monetary institution and the World Bank is a development-finance institution. They are not direct equivalents.

The most relevant comparison is between the opportunities associated with BRICS and those available through the established financial system.

| Issue | IMF and World Bank | BRICS and associated institutions |

| Primary role | Monetary stability, crisis financing and development finance, depending on institution | Cooperation among emerging economies, trade, diplomacy and development financing through associated institutions |

| Financing | IMF programmes and World Bank loans, grants and other instruments under their respective rules | Potential bilateral financing and access to the New Development Bank, subject to eligibility and approval |

| Conditions | Programme-specific macroeconomic, financial, governance or project conditions | Conditions vary by country, lender, project and financing agreement |

| Decision-making | Formal voting power linked substantially to quotas or shareholding | Cooperation through consensus-oriented political processes; financial institutions have their own governance rules |

| Infrastructure | Established capacity for large development programmes and technical assistance | Potential additional infrastructure finance and investment partnerships |

| Trade and industrialisation | Can support reforms and productive investment, but outcomes depend on design and implementation | Potential access to major emerging markets, technology, manufacturing and industrial partnerships |

| Currency options | IMF financing and much international lending operate through established international monetary arrangements | Greater use of national currencies may be possible in selected transactions, but is not guaranteed |

| Main risk | Debt sustainability problems, policy trade-offs and the social costs of poorly designed or poorly implemented reforms | Unequal bargaining power, opaque agreements, geopolitical exposure and projects that fail to deliver value |

The central point is that neither side should be judged by slogans.

The IMF and World Bank have substantial institutional experience and established financing capacity. BRICS offers opportunities for diversification, but its members have different priorities and its financial arrangements do not automatically provide every participant with cheap loans.

A country that borrows from a Chinese bank, for instance, must still assess the interest rate, currency denomination, repayment schedule, guarantees and economic returns. The fact that the lender is associated with a BRICS country does not make a loan automatically affordable.

Likewise, a World Bank project that improves electricity access, agricultural productivity or public health can produce genuine development benefits.

The proper test is simple: Which arrangement delivers the best economic and social returns for Ghana at an acceptable level of risk?

8\. The New Development Bank: Could it be Ghana's biggest opportunity?

One of the most important institutions associated with BRICS is the New Development Bank (NDB).

Established by the founding BRICS countries in 2015, the bank was created to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development in emerging and developing economies. Its authorised capital is US$100 billion.

Its areas of interest include infrastructure, renewable energy, transport, water, sanitation and other forms of sustainable development.

For Ghana, this could be significant.
Imagine a financing strategy in which Ghana develops a strong pipeline of commercially viable and socially beneficial projects, then explores opportunities with the NDB and other development partners.

Potential projects could include:
* Energy: Renewable power, transmission infrastructure, energy storage and improvements to electricity distribution.

* Transport: Railways, logistics corridors, port-related infrastructure and links between production centres and markets.

* Agriculture: Irrigation, storage facilities, food processing and agricultural technology.

* Industry: Industrial parks, mineral processing, pharmaceutical manufacturing and production of machinery or industrial inputs.

* Digital transformation: Secure public digital infrastructure, data centres, digital skills and technology services.

* Water and sanitation: Reliable water supplies, wastewater treatment and urban sanitation.

But a crucial qualification must be understood: joining BRICS does not automatically make Ghana a member of the New Development Bank, nor does it guarantee a loan. The bank has its own membership and accession procedures, and individual projects must meet its applicable requirements.

Ghana would therefore need to pursue two related but distinct objectives: its BRICS membership application and a practical assessment of whether accession to the NDB would be beneficial.

The government should publish a list of priority projects, their estimated costs, expected economic returns and proposed financing arrangements.

It should also explain which projects would create export earnings or replace imports, rather than simply increase public expenditure.

A railway that reduces transport costs for agricultural producers and manufacturers may generate long-term economic benefits. A prestige project with weak demand and expensive financing may instead become another liability for future taxpayers.

The difference is not the name of the lender. It is the quality of the project and the terms of the financing.

9\. What specifically could Ghana gain from joining BRICS?

Ghana's greatest opportunity may be its ability to combine diplomatic diversification with a focused national industrialisation strategy.

A. Adding value to Ghana's natural resources

Ghana has significant gold production, cocoa, manganese, bauxite, oil and agricultural resources.

The country should seek partnerships that help it capture more value from these assets through processing, manufacturing, technology transfer and skills development.

Instead of exporting raw or minimally processed materials and importing higher-value products, Ghana could pursue industrial partnerships that develop domestic production capabilities.

Consider cocoa. Why should Ghana's economic ambitions stop at producing cocoa beans when greater domestic processing, manufacturing, branding and distribution could create additional employment and retain more value locally?

The same question applies to minerals. Mining revenue is important, but the wider economic opportunity includes engineering services, equipment maintenance, refining where commercially and environmentally viable, industrial chemicals and other supporting industries.

BRICS could give Ghana additional partners for this agenda. It cannot guarantee success.

That requires electricity, infrastructure, skilled workers, predictable regulation, access to finance and an investment environment in which businesses can operate competitively.

B. Access to larger markets
The BRICS economies represent a diverse collection of large consumer markets, industrial centres and sources of investment.

For Ghanaian exporters, stronger commercial links could open opportunities in processed foods, agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, services and manufactured goods.

But membership alone will not create demand for Ghanaian products.

Exporters still need to satisfy market standards, compete on price and quality, meet logistical requirements and navigate tariffs and regulatory barriers.

Ghana should therefore negotiate practical outcomes: trade facilitation, export promotion, investment partnerships, standards cooperation and better access for specific Ghanaian products.

C. Technology transfer and skills development

Ghana should use its relationships with major emerging economies to pursue technology partnerships, not merely technology purchases.

The objective should be to train Ghanaian engineers, technicians, scientists, software developers and industrial workers who can maintain, adapt and eventually improve the systems being introduced.

This could include cooperation in digital public services, cybersecurity, agricultural technology, industrial automation, energy systems and technical education.

A project that imports equipment without developing local technical capacity may produce immediate benefits but limited long-term transformation.

A project that builds local expertise can create a multiplier effect across the economy.

D. Financing beyond a narrow set of options

Additional financing sources could improve Ghana's bargaining position.

When governments have credible alternatives, they may be better placed to negotiate loan terms, investment structures and project arrangements.

But this advantage exists only if alternatives are genuinely accessible and financially sound. A country should not take on expensive debt simply to demonstrate geopolitical independence.

Ghana should compare offers based on the total cost of financing, repayment terms, currency risks, procurement conditions, local employment, technology transfer and expected returns.

E. A stronger position in global economic debates

Ghana has a long diplomatic tradition of supporting African cooperation and greater representation for developing countries in international affairs.

Its BRICS application could strengthen its participation in discussions about reforming global institutions, international trade, debt restructuring and development finance.

The opportunity is to advocate for a system that gives African countries greater influence without sacrificing their relationships with other partners.

That would be a more strategic approach than presenting BRICS as a simple contest between East and West.

10\. Why has Ghana struggled despite decades of engagement with the IMF and World Bank?

This is perhaps the most difficult question in the entire debate.

Ghana became independent in 1957 with ambitions for industrialisation, infrastructure development and economic self-reliance. Governments since then have pursued different combinations of state-led development, market-oriented reforms, external borrowing, foreign investment and international assistance.

Ghana's economic history includes significant achievements as well as recurring difficulties: infrastructure expansion, improvements in education and public services, periods of economic growth, commodity-price shocks, fiscal instability, inflation, currency depreciation and debt distress.

Its relationship with the IMF has also changed over time, reflecting different crises and policy approaches.

The current debate must recognise that Ghana's challenges are not the result of one institution or one government alone.

Domestic decisions matter enormously. Governments can borrow imprudently, make poorly evaluated investments, tolerate corruption, create wasteful expenditure, weaken revenue collection or fail to sustain industrial policies beyond electoral cycles.

External conditions matter too. Commodity-price volatility, global interest rates, exchange-rate movements and international economic shocks can undermine even well-intentioned policies.

Nevertheless, a fundamental question remains: if Ghana has repeatedly needed international support, what has prevented successive development strategies from building a sufficiently resilient productive economy?

Why has Ghana not consistently transformed its resource wealth into a broader base of competitive manufacturing, agricultural processing, technology, export earnings and well-paid jobs?

Why do economic adjustment programmes so often become urgent after problems have accumulated, rather than being preceded by stronger fiscal discipline, transparent procurement and productive investment?

And why should Ghanaian taxpayers continue to carry the cost of economic mistakes without a stronger system of accountability for the officials and institutions responsible?

These questions should not be used to dismiss all the achievements of international development institutions. They should instead encourage an honest evaluation of results.

The IMF's own stated purpose is monetary and financial stability, not the direct construction of a complete industrial economy. The World Bank supports development, but its projects cannot substitute for a coherent national economic strategy.

Ghana must stop confusing financial stabilisation with economic transformation.

Stabilising inflation, rebuilding reserves and restoring debt sustainability are important. But they are foundations, not the final destination.

The ultimate test is whether Ghana can generate enough productive employment, exports, public revenue and domestic investment to finance its development without repeatedly falling into severe economic crises.

11\. Is BRICS a genuine alternative, or could Ghana encounter another form of dependence?

A serious article about BRICS must examine the risks as closely as it examines the opportunities.

China's economic weight
China is a major economic power within BRICS. Its industrial capacity and financing potential can offer important opportunities to Ghana.

But a partnership with China does not automatically guarantee favourable outcomes.

Ghana must ensure that agreements deliver local employment, competitive procurement, transparent pricing, skills development and a fair distribution of economic benefits.

If Ghana imports most of its manufactured goods from one partner, borrows heavily from that partner and exports mainly raw materials to it, has the country truly diversified its economic dependence?

Or has it simply changed the direction of its dependence?

Geopolitical tensions and sanctions
BRICS includes countries whose relationships with Western governments vary considerably.

Some members face significant sanctions or restrictions affecting banking, investment and international transactions.

Ghana must assess whether specific transactions could expose its financial institutions, exporters or international partners to legal or commercial risks.

Diplomatic diversification should expand Ghana's options, not create avoidable vulnerabilities.

The risk of new debt without new productive capacity

The existence of an alternative lender does not resolve the fundamental question of debt sustainability.

If Ghana borrows to finance projects that fail to generate sufficient economic returns, the debt burden remains.

A loan for productive infrastructure can support growth. A loan for an unnecessary project can consume resources that should have gone towards education, healthcare, maintenance and industrial development.

Ghana should therefore insist on transparent debt contracts, independent project appraisal, parliamentary oversight where required, and public reporting on how borrowed money is used.

BRICS is not a single economic authority

BRICS does not operate as a unified government with one treasury, one central bank or a single common development budget. Its political cooperation and its associated financial institutions have distinct structures.

This matters because Ghana cannot assume that a BRICS declaration translates automatically into funding, preferential market access or emergency financial support.

The country must negotiate with specific governments, banks, companies and institutions and evaluate each agreement on its own merits.

The ultimate question is not whether the lender is Western, Asian, African or Middle Eastern. It is whether the arrangement is transparent, affordable and beneficial to Ghana.

12\. What are people saying about BRICS?

There are several broad schools of thought in the international debate.

Supporters argue that BRICS gives emerging economies a stronger collective voice, encourages cooperation among developing countries and creates opportunities to diversify trade and development finance. They see it as part of a shift towards a multipolar international order.

Critics argue that the grouping is too diverse to act consistently, that its members have competing geopolitical interests and that China and other powerful countries may exercise considerable influence over smaller partners. They also caution that BRICS membership alone cannot solve domestic economic problems.

Pragmatists argue that countries should work with BRICS and Western institutions simultaneously, selecting partners according to their economic interests rather than ideological loyalties.

For Ghana, the pragmatic approach appears most consistent with the government's publicly stated position.

The debate should focus on whether Ghana can secure better terms, greater market access, productive investment and stronger negotiating power.

A country does not become economically independent merely by changing its diplomatic partners. It becomes more independent when it can produce more of what it consumes, export competitive goods and services, generate domestic savings, manage public finances responsibly and negotiate with external partners from a position of strength.

That is the standard by which BRICS should be judged.

13\. The hard-hitting questions Ghana must ask

These are questions for the Ghanaian government, the IMF, the World Bank, BRICS members, investors and African citizens.

Questions for the IMF and World Bank
1\. After decades of development programmes across Africa, why do so many countries still struggle to move from raw-material exports to competitive industrial economies?

2\. How should the success of an economic programme be measured if inflation and fiscal indicators improve but job creation, household incomes and industrial capacity remain weak?

3\. What responsibility should international lenders accept when the social costs of adjustment programmes prove greater than anticipated?

4\. Why should countries with limited fiscal space sometimes face pressure to reduce spending when their infrastructure, education and healthcare systems require substantial investment?

5\. Are the governance arrangements of international financial institutions sufficiently representative of Africa's population, development needs and economic interests?

6\. What evidence demonstrates that the conditions attached to particular loans have delivered better long-term outcomes than less restrictive alternatives would have achieved?

7\. Why is there no universally accepted, transparent framework that makes it easier for citizens to compare the promised benefits of development programmes against their actual costs and results?

8\. When a country repeatedly experiences debt distress, how much responsibility lies with domestic governments, how much with creditors, and how should that responsibility be reflected in debt restructuring?

9\. Should development institutions be judged more directly on employment, productivity, poverty reduction and industrial growth—not only on financial and macroeconomic indicators?

10\. If international lenders want African economies to become more resilient, what practical financing arrangements can help countries invest in productive capacity without creating unsustainable debt?

These questions do not presume that the IMF and World Bank have failed in every respect. They demand that institutions with considerable influence over public policy be accountable for the outcomes of their programmes.

Questions for BRICS and its powerful members

11\. If BRICS promises a more equitable international order, what specific voting, financing or governance reforms will give smaller members meaningful influence?

12\. Will African countries receive financing on genuinely competitive terms, or will they face a different set of creditors with their own commercial and strategic interests?

13\. Will major BRICS economies commit to transferring technology and building manufacturing capacity in Africa, or will African countries remain predominantly suppliers of minerals and agricultural commodities?

14\. How will BRICS members ensure that infrastructure agreements are transparent, debt risks are disclosed and local communities receive fair benefits?

15\. If BRICS offers a credible development alternative, what evidence will demonstrate that its projects produce stronger employment, productivity and poverty-reduction outcomes?

16\. Can African members influence the priorities of the grouping, or will the agenda be dominated by the interests of its largest economies?

17\. What protections will Ghana have if a major partner's political or commercial interests change after a long-term financing agreement has been signed?

18\. Will BRICS help African countries develop their own industrial and technological capabilities, or merely create additional markets for the exports of its more industrialised members?

These questions must be answered before enthusiasm becomes complacency.

Questions for Ghana's government
19\. What measurable economic benefits does Ghana expect from BRICS membership over the next five and ten years?

20\. Which three to five industrial projects will the government prioritise, and how many sustainable jobs are they expected to create?

21\. Will Ghana explore New Development Bank membership separately, and what would be the financial and institutional implications?

22\. What safeguards will prevent BRICS-related borrowing from increasing public debt without generating sufficient economic returns?

23\. How will Ghana ensure that agreements include technology transfer, local skills development, domestic value addition and fair opportunities for Ghanaian businesses?

24\. Will the government publish the costs, terms and expected benefits of major agreements reached through BRICS cooperation?

25\. How will Ghana maintain productive relationships with the IMF, World Bank, Western partners and African institutions while diversifying its partnerships?

26\. What happens if the expected investments do not materialise? What is the government's alternative plan?

The question nobody should be afraid to ask

If Ghana can access global finance, natural resources, international markets and decades of development advice, why has the country not yet built an economy capable of financing a much greater share of its own development?

That question is not an indictment of any single institution. It is a challenge to the entire development model, including the governments that negotiate the loans, the institutions that provide them, the businesses that benefit from public contracts and the political systems that determine how national resources are used.

The most important question may not be whether Ghana should choose BRICS over the IMF and World Bank.

It may be why Ghana has not done more to ensure that its engagement with all these institutions produces lasting economic independence.

14\. What Ghana must do to turn BRICS membership into a national development strategy

Ghana should approach the application with a clear economic plan rather than treating membership as an achievement in itself.

1\. Put industrialisation first
Identify sectors in which Ghana can compete, such as agro-processing, mineral value addition, pharmaceuticals, selected manufactured goods and technology services. Seek partners who can help build productive capacity, not just sell finished products.

2\. Negotiate projects, not just declarations

Develop a shortlist of bankable projects with transparent feasibility studies, clear financing terms, measurable job targets and credible repayment plans.

3\. Assess the New Development Bank separately

Determine the costs, obligations, eligibility requirements and potential advantages of joining the bank. Do not assume that BRICS membership automatically unlocks its financing.

4\. Protect Ghana's economic sovereignty

Publish major financing agreements, disclose guarantees and repayment obligations, strengthen parliamentary scrutiny and ensure that contracts comply with Ghanaian law.

5\. Make technology transfer non-negotiable where feasible

Include training, local supplier participation, maintenance capacity and skills development in relevant investment agreements so that Ghanaian workers and companies gain lasting capabilities.

6\. Measure results publicly
Report annually on investment realised, jobs created, export growth, local processing, technology transfer, debt exposure and project performance. Compare actual outcomes with the original promises.

Ghana should also coordinate its BRICS strategy with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The goal should be to use partnerships with emerging economies to expand production and trade across Africa, rather than encourage each African country to negotiate separately and compete against its neighbours for the same investment.

A stronger regional market could make Ghana more attractive to manufacturers seeking scale, efficient logistics and access to a wider customer base.

15\. The final verdict: Is BRICS Ghana's escape route?

BRICS is an opportunity, not a miracle.
It could widen Ghana's access to markets, investment, industrial technology, infrastructure financing and diplomatic partnerships. It could also give Ghana additional leverage when negotiating with established international institutions.

But none of those benefits is automatic.

The New Development Bank has its own rules. Bilateral loans carry their own risks. Foreign investment depends on commercial realities. Industrialisation requires consistent domestic policies, skilled workers, infrastructure and a government capable of turning agreements into results.

Ghana should not join BRICS merely to make a political statement against the West. Nor should it remain dependent on a narrow set of partners because changing established relationships is difficult.

The country should pursue a more ambitious objective: a diversified economy in which international partnerships serve Ghana's development priorities, rather than Ghana's development priorities being dictated by the availability of external finance.

The IMF and World Bank should be judged by what their programmes actually achieve. BRICS should be judged by the same standard. Ghana's own political leaders must be held accountable for how effectively they negotiate, spend and manage the opportunities these partnerships provide.

The world is changing. Emerging economies have become increasingly important to global production, trade and finance. African countries have legitimate reasons to demand greater influence over the institutions that affect their futures.

But economic independence cannot be imported. It must be built through domestic productivity, industrialisation, accountable government, sound financial management and the ability to create value from national resources.

Ghana's BRICS application should therefore mark the beginning of a serious national conversation—not the end of one.

The question is not simply whether BRICS can help Ghana.

It is whether Ghana is finally prepared to use every available partnership to build an economy that needs fewer emergency rescues, creates more decent jobs, processes more of its own resources and gives future generations greater control over their economic destiny.

And here is the question that should follow every international agreement signed in Accra:

Ten years from now, will Ghanaians be able to point to more factories, more productive jobs, stronger exports, better infrastructure and greater economic security or will we once again be debating why another development partnership failed to deliver the transformation we were promised?

That is the test BRICS must pass.
And that is the test Ghana must set for itself.

By:
Patrick Belebang Yagsori
0240292413
patrickbelebang@gmail.com

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