Non-Partisan Sub-Structure Under A Partisan Super- Structure

Popular participation has been an issue in development management from the beginning, but its significance has increased principally because it has become part of official rhetoric. (Ayee Joseph R.A.)

Last Tuesday September 1, 2015 finally saw the District Assemblies' elections held throughout the country after months of delays as a result of the intransigence of the Kwadwo Afari-Gyan-led Electoral Commission. A Supreme Court decision put a stop to an election which was supposed to have taken place in March of this year. Ghanaians were supposed to have voted to elect their assembly members to represent them in the various District, Municipal and Metropolitan Assemblies nationwide.

Reports so far indicate a very poor turnout nationally, bad as it is, it is also not surprising since the non-partisan District Assembly elections have always recorded a very poor turnout for varied reasons. Its best performance was the 1988 one, which attracted 59 percent voter turnout.  While the general population exhibited gross indifference towards the event, it must be admitted that there was massive enthusiasm among the contestants in the last elections nationally, particularly before the Supreme Court halted the one which should have taken place in March. Even though the cancellation of the initial voting doused this national enthusiasm, it nonetheless attracted mass contesting participants of people of both gender and of varied ages.

The Local Government act, Act 462 of 1993 section 5 (1) gives the composition of the District Assemblies as follows: (a) the District Chief Executive;  (who is nominated by the President and approved by the Assembly),  (b) one person from each electoral area within the District elected by universal adult suffrage in accordance with regulations made by the Electoral Commission, (c) the member or members of Parliament from the constituencies that fall within the area of authority of the District Assembly except that such member or members of Parliament shall have no voting rights; and (d) other persons not exceeding 30 percent of the total membership of the Assembly appointed by the President in consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest groups in the district'.

Decentralization has been defined by Ayee as 'the transfer of power and authority by the central government to subnational units, either by political, administrative, economic and fiscal means'.  Prof. Kwamena Ahwoi who can be described as Ghana's longest Minister of Local Government, and who obviously was the pillar behind the decentralization programme under the PNDC regime, also noted some 15 years back that 'the thrust of Ghana's policy (decentralization) has been to promote popular participation by shifting the process of governance from command to consultative processes and by devolving power, competence and resources and means to the district level'.

   Looking at the composition of the District Assemblies above and the rational behind the concept as brilliantly espoused by the two eminent people above, it is evidently clear that power and authority even though transferred to the subnational units, the central government still holds onto the tale of the principles of decentralization. Even though the decision making at that level is by the Assembly, the Chief Executive and the 30 percent appointees by the President is an impediment towards the issue of 'of shifting the process of governance from command to consultative' and complete 'devolution of power, competence and resources and means to the district level'.

The very first question is, why should the Assembly be made up of a mixture of elected and appointed members?  Well, the initial explanation and may be the explanation still is that, the 30 percent appointees is to make up for the 'lost skills' the Assemblies may not have from the elected members. Indeed, the 1988 Assemblies had the opportunity of having these appointed skills because the 30 percent appointed members were not chosen on partisan political lines because the country was still under an authoritarian rule. In fact the caliber of the appointees far outshined the elected ones in almost all the Assemblies. The appointees took up the Presiding Member positions and virtually chaired all the committees in the Assemblies.

Post 1988, the situation changed, and skills of the 30 percent appointees gave way to unskilled political party supporters who needed to be rewarded for good work done for the political party. Subsequently, the District Chief Executive is appointed by the President for the Assembly constituted by 30 percent of the appointed members by the President to approve of him or her. There is currently a raging debate on the issue of whether the DCE should continue to be appointed by the President or be elected through universal adult suffrage.

Sadly, those who support the status quo are looking at just one side of the situation which is beneficial to the ruling political party and not the overall benefit the District will derive from the election of a DCE. Under the present dispensation, the most vulnerable politician in this country is the DCE, and I am using DCE generically. He is the least respected in the political hierarchy, from the Youth Organizer of the party at the Constituency level to the Presidency, the DCE is malleable to the whims and caprices of the political chain. His tenure of office is dependent on how well he meets the demands of political party people in the constituency and not how well he manages the collective resources of the people.

The insecurity of the tenure of the DCE does not bring the best in him since he keeps on looking over his shoulder to see who to please or which powerful individuals is he displeasing if he has to continue to be in office. Besides the political pressures on him, the central government goes ahead to take away with the left hand, the resources it has given to the Assembly with the right hand. While the Act 462 gives the planning and budgetary powers to the Assemblies, the Local Government Ministers procure goods and services the Assemblies themselves have not thought of or budgeted for, impose those goods on the Assemblies and effect payments through direct deductions from the District Assemblies' Common Fund (DACF) before the funds get to the Assemblies.

Why should the central government procure mass vehicles of the same type and kind for all the Assemblies when the terrains and vehicular needs are not the same, and deduct the monies when the Assemblies did not even have prior knowledge of the cost of the vehicles? In some instances, ordinary roofing sheets are procured by the central government and dumped on the Assemblies and in the process, making their planned activities ineffective because of diversion of funds for unplanned activities.

There have been arguments of security for the President when 'a hostile' DCE is the chairman of the District Security Council (DISEC). The DCE takes advice from members of DISEC who are professional Security Officers on matters of security in the District. The Officers invariably take orders from their regional superiors on all security matters. When the President is in a particular District , security is in the hands of National Security Operatives and not DISEC.  The DCE can never be a threat to the President.

 Road construction for example is the responsibility of the central government, how can the DCE stop the central government from constructing roads in his district and expect the people to vote for him the next time? How can the DCE impede the provision of electricity in his district because he belongs to a political party different from that of the President? We live in delusion that the District Assemblies are non-partisan, as you read this piece, political parties are calculating how many of their people won in all the Districts.

The advocates of the non-elective positions are scared of losing the annexation of the resources of the Assemblies for political advantage. All the political parties are guilty and are the causes of the slow developments at the District levels. A study of the disbursements of the DACF will show that the Assemblies in recent times barely receive 40 percent of what is allocated to them. Where does the 60% go? Let us consider the elections of the DCEs to make them accountable to the people and shove off the central government misuse of their monies.