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12.04.2014 Feature Article

THEOREMS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

THEOREMS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
12.04.2014 LISTEN

In the absence of external mediators in dealing with political elections and its decisions making, the market and its political atmosphere enjoys efficiency regarding normal allocation of resources and redistribution of wealth. Both in the conflict situations and uncertainty concerning election results, the nation and its citizens suffer from political destabilization that lead to a major stagnation of progress. Wants are impeded and scarcity can be created in the whole economic system. Efficiency in the market situation is registered when all go well for the economy which fulfills the first law of the Welfare economics. For markets are not simply a “mechanism”; markets are concerned with peaceful exchange of goods and services. There are also sufficient conditions for a market to be efficient, which include transparency, efficiency, and distribution free of economic welfare.

When persons are uninhibited to deal with exchanges in a competitive marketplace where no externalities in production or consumption exist, the resulting distribution of the economy is Pareto efficient; that is, no individual can be made better off without making some other person worse off.

The theorems deduced from the theory of Double Count Policy are important for political decision making, and they contribute to efficient economic management in the fields of economics and politics, which are usually beset with other sundry problems that lead to major setbacks for modern-day progress in the world economy. It could lead to bubbles in the marketplace when transient recession is not put to check.

The deduction of these two theorems unveils no third party is required in the decision making, which is a big contrast when elections results present major escalation in the political arena which influence market efficiency and redistribution of wealth.

The theorems also reveal the major responsibility which is put on leaders in the making. They are supposed to show maturity in dealing with cases involving their opponents and election results in general. If they fail to learn how to negotiate at this initial stage, it may not say good about them and their parties and its members, who usually give them their unwavering support in dealing with election initiatives that crop up during unforeseen circumstances about failure to win or perform well with elections. Having to deal with each other in order to prevent any future “transactional cost”, they may enjoy all the support they need at the crucial stage of their political careers. “Prevention is better than cure” in matters regarding political administration. That is what the theorems caution in regards to the use of appropriate methods in dealing with conflict and uncertainty situations in the field of economic distribution of wealth and services and also political systems.

To summarize these theorems, briefly, let us observe these: If two contestants µ and β, of two political parties A and B, should agree as to the claims of a final election without bargaining, these latter parties A and B, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the results would always accept their decisions as their own decisions without creating controversy about their joint acceptances. This is the theorem known as the contestants' theorem. It postulates the smooth agreement between contestants' µ and β with parties about their own party members A and B concerning the overall decision making that determines the state of the affairs in the nation X. But when due to fragile conflicting situation concerning election results, conflict K ensues, and in the course of the controversy surrounding K, one of the contestants, either µ or β should decide to give up, the K will suddenly lead to nowhere by mere fact that one of the contestants of party A or B has decided to give up in pursuing conflict K. This latter theorem, which postulates the chaos and disturbing nature of conflict K that could turn a serene atmosphere into pandemonium, is called the conflict theorem.

Conflict theorem defines the election situation of what usually transpire when elections are unsuccessful and, as a result, they are not accepted in the larger society. This theorem is important because it allows for a separation of equilibrium atmosphere on the one hand, and a conflict or chaos situation that ensues or non-acceptance of the strenuous effort invested in executing the elections in the country in question, on the other hand. Individuals, who did not agree to the election results, including the opposing contestant and his party, will call for a recount or fresh elections to be commenced. This call will be made in compliance with the policy regarding elections and of unsuccessful elections that result due to conflict.

These two theorems can be argued to be the cornerstone of political elections that either turn off or turn on crisis situation among parties in the process of making a leadership, which could run the economic activities in the country X, following the successful elections.

References
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Calsamiglia, Xavier, and Alan Kirman (1993). "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes," Econometrica, 61(5), p p. 1147-1172.

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