Predictability Of The Two Fundamental Theorems Of Political Elections

ABSTRACT

Two theorems of Double Count Policy theory are discussed in order to see its usefulness in society. It allows efficiency to prevail in the market as well as in the society thereby fulfilling the first theorem of Welfare Economics.

1. Preamble

Like many other scientific endeavors, the goal of behavioral science is to understand and predict the behavior of human beings in their interaction with one another by taking advantage of empirical knowledge derived from observation and by deducing theorems from axioms. If we accept this general premise in regard to human behaviors, then we can also deduce theorems mathematically that can aid us to later generate empirical information. In the Double Count Policy theory, advanced recently for the area of political economy, we made important findings which resulted in the two theorems of political elections. They are political and economic theorems that are named the Contestants theorem and Conflict theorem.

2. Contestant theorem and Conflict theorem

The first of theorems states that if the last two contestants of a final general election accept the results of the final election, it always leads to the acceptances by both parties in which these two candidates represent.

The second theorem, which is Conflict theorem, states that conflicts concerning election do not entail the whole members of the conflicting parties; it occurs between the last two contestants; a few members of the parties; and etc, and can easily be resolved if one of the two contestants were to give up.

3. Analysis of Predictability

In the first mentioned theorem, we can state that there is predictability in the theorem, in that when the two last contestants move to recognize and accept the verdict given by the citizens of a country, we find out that both parties of the contestants usually agree and no one says anything negative with regards to the decisions taken by the last two contestants. Here, predictability is very strong (p≥ 1) and it gives confidence to the acceptance of the overall election results. We could here employ probability theory to elucidate on how there is a stronger dependence between the two variables, i.e., the contestants and the party adherents. The acceptance of the latter variable depended on the former, which could allow us to use the "if then" approach or formula. Thus, "if the candidates, µ and β have agreed, then parties A and B will also agree". It could also be written like "If (µ) and (β), then, (A) and (B).

The first theorem, while encouraging us to observe a successful and efficient approach to the acceptance of election results, also enables us to predict backwards that "If there had been election conflicts or disagreement in connection with acceptance, the decision by any of these two candidates or contestants to give up or quit makes us to reckon with certainty that the conflict will be resolved". It is a predictability that we see by reckoning backwards rather than forward. The second theorem can also be seen in a probabilistic domain. These theorems can be proved easily and they take place in ordinary life, which provide us confidence to recognize them as mathematical theorems that need to be accepted as essential in its contribution toward economic and political issues, i.e., __ political decision making.

Thus, "If conflict (K) is to ensue, and contestant (µ) decides not to fight Contestant (β), then the (K) is resolved by mere fact that contestant (µ) is not making an issue about the (K), which Contestant (β) is involved in connection with final election results.

4. Conclusion and Implication

As no intervention of mediators or the court is required to thrash matters out, the theorems are significant, and they offer efficient and genuine equilibrium both in the market and in the society after the post-election months and onward. It gives efficient economic management of the market situation to those countries and their political parties.

5. References
Campbell, D.E. and Kelly, J.S. (2002) Impossibility theorems in the Arrovian framework, in Handbook of social choice and welfare (ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen and Kotaro Suzumura), volume 1, pages 35–94, Elsevier. Surveys

The Mathematics of Behavior by Earl Hunt, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Why flip a coin? : The art and science of good decisions by Harold W. Lewis, John Wiley, 1997.

Sen, A. K. (1979) “Personal utilities and public judgments: or what's wrong with welfare economics?” The Economic Journal, 89, 537-558,

Yu, Ning Neil (2012) A one-shot proof of Arrow's theorem. Economic Theory, volume 50, issue 2, pages 523-525, Springer.