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29.03.2014 Feature Article

Two Fundamental Theorems Of Political Elections

Two Fundamental Theorems Of Political Elections
29.03.2014 LISTEN

1. Introduction
In the theory of Double Count Policy, we made a discovery that led to the two theorems dubbed now as the two fundamental theorems of political elections. They are political and economic theorems that we intend to make some brief discussions about them. The first is named the Contestants theorem while the second is called Conflict theorem.

2. Contestants theorem
The contestants' theorem states that if the last two contestants of a final general election accept the results of the final election, it always leads to the acceptances by both parties in which these two candidates represent or belong.

3. Conflict theorem
Conflict theorems states that conflicts concerning election do not entail the whole members of the conflicting parties; it occurs between the last two contestants; a few members of the parties; and etc, and can easily be resolved if one of the two contestants were to give up.

4. Analysis and Discussion
The main idea behind these two political and economic theorems is that the acceptance of the last two contestants or candidates leads to acceptances of both parties they represent. Thus, no intervention of mediators or the court is required to thrash matters. It is supposed to offer efficient and genuine equilibrium in the society in question after the post-election hours. This assumption is genuinely practiced, and is indeed seen as occurring in real life to offer efficient economic management of the situation to those countries and their political parties.

The second theorem allows a more thorough picture of election results or outcome to be observed and ascertained; it offers a real definition of what usually transpire when elections are unsuccessful and, as a result, they are unaccepted in society. This theorem is essential because it allows for a separation of equilibrium atmosphere, and a conflict or chaos situation that ensues or non-acceptance of the strenuous effort invested in executing the elections in the country in question. Those who did not agree to the election results, including the opposing contestant, will call for a recount or fresh elections to take place. This will certainly be in compliance with the policy regarding elections and of unsuccessful elections that result due to conflict.

5. References
Campbell, D.E. and Kelly, J.S. (2002) Impossibility theorems in the Arrovian framework, in Handbook of social choice and welfare (ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen and Kotaro Suzumura), volume 1, pages 35–94, Elsevier. Surveys

The Mathematics of Behavior by Earl Hunt, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Why flip a coin? : The art and science of good decisions by Harold W. Lewis, John Wiley, 1997.

Sen, A. K. (1979) “Personal utilities and public judgments: or what's wrong with welfare economics?” The Economic Journal, 89, 537-558,

Yu, Ning Neil (2012) A one-shot proof of Arrow's theorem. Economic Theory, volume 50, issue 2, pages 523-525, Springer.

6. Appendix
Let us imagine that
¨a¨ is a candidate for one party called ¨A¨. Then under set theory we could write {a} € {A}

Similarly ¨b¨ is a candidate for one party called ¨B¨. Then under set theory we could write {b} € {B}

Candidate {a} has agreed concerning the election results and also Candidate {b} has accepted as well. Since according to Set theorem by Zermelo (1904) ¨Every set can be well-ordered¨

Then the formula for Contestant theorem could be written like this

{a} € {A}= {b} € {B}, using the sign = to indicate their agreement over the election result.

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