body-container-line-1

OVER HALF A CENTURY OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIP IN EGYPT - all you need to know -

Feature Article In this image taken from TV, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, right, is seen shaking the hand of Omar Suleiman, who is sworn in as Vice President of Egypt, Saturday Jan. 29, 2011. AP  Egypt State TV
JAN 30, 2011 LISTEN
In this image taken from TV, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, right, is seen shaking the hand of Omar Suleiman, who is sworn in as Vice President of Egypt, Saturday Jan. 29, 2011. (AP / Egypt State TV)

INTRODUCTION
Although Egypt has been one of the highest recipients of US aid not only in Africa but the world, the conditionalities of democratic reforms which became a benchmark for the dispensation of aid by Western countries to African countries and other developing countries, from the 1990s onward has done little to bring democratic reforms to Egypt. It is on record that the US had dispensed a record amount of aid totalling US$28 billion to Egypt since 1975—three decades and more (USAID, 2007).

From the Egyptian experience, it is clear that internal factors such as the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and other political groupings with religious inclinations, the military tradition dating back to the Free Officers Movement uprising of 1952, and personal autocratic style coupled with external factors such as international terrorism, domestic terrorism with international implications, US and European Union strategic interest in the Suez Canal has engendered a guise under which autocratic rule in Egypt has flourished in her six decades of independence.

HISTORICAL REVIEW
Esposito and Voll (1996) posit there is “no universally accepted or clearly defined model of democracy, even of Western democracy, that can simply be adopted by people engaging in democratization.” In the same way, different countries have different socio-political and economic structures implying different trajectories for different countries in the democratization process. While some adopt the gradual approach, some suddenly, some as result deep socio-economic changes, others [it may] be as a result of political upheavals. But there are certainly some similarities in the final stages of transformation in some countries (Ottaway & Choucair-Vizoso, 2005, p.5).

Huntington's (1991) democratic approaches are therefore deductible (deductive concept) working definitions for the purpose of this paper. These are: (a) the source of authority for government; (b) the purpose serve by the government; and (c) procedures for constituting government.

The post-World War II brought new political realities to the African continent, culminating in scores of them gaining independence between the 1950s and the 1960s. Egypt itself gained her independence on June 18, 1953 from the British. But a decade later, most of these countries, including Egypt were either under military dictatorship or operated single-party under a democratic façade. The result was widespread human rights abuses, corruption, weak governance institutions, poor economic performance, and total misrule (Kassem, 2004, p.51).

It is in this milieu that the installation of democracy became the “donor's final refuge to show that aid interventions could work, would work, if only the political conditions were right.” (Moyo, 2009, p.24). Democratization and its transposable words, good governance, therefore, became the benchmark for international donors for the dispensation of much needed aid in African countries, including Egypt by the 1990s.

When Egypt became a British protectorate in 1914, it had its first constitution based on the parliamentary representative system of government in 1923, granting some internal autonomy to the country, with British advisors and military presence still in the country. This was, however, truncated by the Free Officers Movement in a coupe d'état known as the 1952 Revolution (Ottaway & Chouaur 2008). General Muhammad Neguib, the bellwether of the Free Officers Movement, toppled the monarch and became the first President of the Egyptian Republic on June 18 1953, [deriving his authority from the military] (Kassem, 2004, p1). Neguib was toppled a year later (1954) by Gamal Abdel Nasser—the real architect of the 1952 coupe—who led Egypt to full independence on June 18 1956, setting in motion a long tradition of military succession or personal autocracy which has survived for more than five decades (Kassem, 2004, p.1).

Since the military coupe of 1952, the formal political structure in Egypt has changed considerably. Like many African leaders after independence, Nasser established a populist-socialist single party state (Kassem, 2004, p. 18). Using Law 32 of the constitution (1964), he banned political parties and regulated civil associations. According to this law, civil association in Egypt could not function without first being registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. This eventually weakened civil society and concomitantly weakened opposition to Nasser's personal autocracy. Nasser's presidency witnessed rapid changes in the constitution. Following the provision constitution of 1953 were that of 1956, 1958, 1962, and 1964, all in an attempt to consolidate personal power. For example, the 1956 constitution replaced a parliamentary system of government in with presidential republican system of government in which president appoints and dismisses ministers. During this time, Nasser institutionalized a formal system of personal political control over individual groupings and state institutions (Kassem, 2004, p.19).

The 1964 constitution, therefore, sealed the presidency from any form of political competition as pertains in democracies. The president is officially instated by referendum. The legislature is responsible for nominating the presidential candidate, and once nominated, the candidate must then obtain two-thirds of the votes of the legislature before being “referred to the citizens for a plebiscite (Article 78). Since the assembly can only refer one person to a national plebiscite, the president does not compete for his position with other candidates. Secondly, and interrelated to the first, there are no sectors in society that formally support an opponent to the president (Kassem, 2004, p.23). And thirdly, a single-party implies that there would not be any credible opposition in the legislature for the president. This way, once the president is nominated by the house, there are no significant challenges in his way to becoming a president. This means the president acquires office on near-unanimous support with absolute legal legitimacy. Considering Nasser military background, it is apt to consider this process nomination and affirmation.

When Gamal Abdel Nasser died of heart attack in 1970, his successors, Anwar al-Sadat, who was a military colonel and his deputy, took over as a president. Instead of undertaking reforms that will strengthen civil society, political participation and wean the presidency away from the military, a close look at the 1971 constitution indicates that he rather embarked on a process that further consolidated power at the presidency, increasing its powers over all other organs of government, and towards his own autocracy.

Under the 1971 constitution, the president retained the authority to promulgate as well as object to laws (Article 112), rule by decree (Article 147), declare a state of emergency (Article 148), appoint and dismiss the entire cabinet (Article 141). The president was further vested with the powers to draft the state budget (Article 115), formulate state's general policy (Article 138) (Kassem, 2004, p.24). Clearly, while a rule by decree is a feature of the military, it is clear that in most democracies, promulgation of laws are within the purview of the legislature, and so are the drafting of a state budget within the orbits of an economic ministry. In this case all the powers of most important institutions of state were usurped by the presidency.

The judiciary had not been left out of these measures. Its independence was effectively compromised by law 46 of 1972 which empowered the president to appoint and promote judges, public prosecutors, the attorney general, court of cassation judges, and judges to the Supreme Constitutional Court. Even the state council courts which specialize in the settling of administrative disputes and disciplinary case are also presided over by the president (Article 173). It is obvious that no judge would rule against his appointing authority in cases involving the latter considering the fact that that authority pervade the nook and cranny of the judicial system unencumbered. It is therefore deducible that Sadat usurped the powers of those state institutions for his personal aggrandizement—personal autocracy.

In that regard, the ideals of separation of powers, independence of the judiciary and checks and balances which are to the hallmark of statecraft in a democracy, not for their own sake but in guaranteeing that the executive branch of government is not overbearing in its activities, are completely eliminated, creating “government of men and not of laws.” The ruler exercise his power without restraint, at his own direction…unencumbered by rules and without commitment to an ideology or value system (Kassem, 2004, 12). The fact that Nasser and Sadat usurped the powers of the legislature reflected in even the percentage bills (8 percent) passed by the legislature between 1970 and 1971 (Kassem, 2004, p.24).

The next in line with regard to Egypt's military tradition is the current President, Muhammad Hosni Mubarak, a former army officer and one time Chief-of-Staff of the Egyptian Air Force. Serving under Anwar Sadat as a deputy president from 1975 automatically made him heir apparent when the president was assassinated in 1981 by a Muslim military soldier (Kassem, 2004, p. 26).

The circumstances surrounding the assassination of his predecessor called for stringent measures to contain the lingering threat of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic movements which posed a great threat to the stability of the state. Mubarak, with his long-term ambitions of personalizing the president, exploited the situation to its fullest. First, the imposition of a state of emergency, using Article 148 of the 1971 constitution was practical. This provided Mubarak with the legal right to control every level of political activity under the emergency rule. The government is unrestricted from censoring activities including freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, the right to seize and confiscate letters, newspapers, publications and all other mass expression. Law 93 of 1995 actually spells out prison sentence for journalists who publish false of malicious news (Kassem, 2004, 55). This way, the media, for fourth estate of the real, was effectively submerged. Second, he employed shrewd but deceptive techniques to promote himself as a strong advocate of democracy indicating he had no wish for long-term presidential rule and monopoly of power (Kassem, 2004, p. 24)

But it was just a matter of time before he exploited the situation and consolidated his rule, just as his predecessor who also proclaimed his disdain for long-term presidential rule but had to amend the constitution to enter his third term.

Under Mubarak, the legislature was encumbered even more. For example, following the first 1984 legislative election under Mubarak's rule, the number of bills initiated by the executive totaled 427 while the members of parliament initiated meager 27 bills. In 1987, the discrepancy was even starker with the executive initiating 659 bills in comparison with 10 from the legislators. And between 1996 and 1997, the executive initiated 36 bills while the legislature initiated none (Kassem, 2004, p. 30).

Further indication of closing of political space to opponents was the introduction of the 1983 electoral law, which outlawed independent candidates from contesting elections for parliament. The Prime Minister, Fo' ad Mohyi al Din admitted that the clause was intended to limit the legislature from individuals who might not be known to the regime (Kassen P29. 2004). So discernibly, from 1954 to 1976 party politics was limited to a single organization conncted to the president. From 1976 onward, President Anwar Sadat and Mubarak have overseen a period of “guided multipartyism” in which they allowed a total of eight parliamentary elections by 2005 (Brownlee, 2007, p. 2).

The military involvement in civil life has not changed since the days of Nasser. Thirty-three percent of cabinet members came from military backgrounds, with a small circle of officers and apparatchiks running most state institutions (Brownlee, 2007, p. 4). This reflected even in the conduct of arbitrations with 1 033 civilians tried in military courts between 1992 and 2000, with 92 persons receiving death sentences. There were also between 12 000 – 15 000 political prisoners lingering in Egyptian prisons by 2004 (Kassem, 2004, p. 40). The military, therefore, is an obvious outer perimeter of regime protection, sheltering those truly wielding power (Cook, 2007, p.2).

Other measures that give the president unlimited powers include Article 7 of law 14 of 1923 which prevents meetings and demonstrations. This article has been passed down through generations and has been used to harass and muzzle opposition against the status quo. There is also Article 77 which sets the presidential term at six years but without term limits. Interestingly, “as “Mubarak begun his “elected” fifth six-year term in office, his second place finisher was serving a five-year prison sentence for his activities in opposition” (Brownlee, 2007, p. 2).

The police maintained prominent role in supervision of voting and ballot counting in legislative and local elections, as well as presidential referendum. Obviously, this situation only accrues in favor of Mubarak who is the Commander-in-chief of the police force. The police are actually on record to have prevented voter entry to polling stations in constituencies and areas that had popular opposition candidates. This, in addition to its role of arresting potential popular opposition leaders, reflects the degree of the police-backed interference and bias toward the regime (Kassem, 2004, p. 41).

When judges challenged the use of the police for supervision of elections and ensured that responsibility came under their supervision in 2000, Mubarak took a disciplinary action against the leaders of the judges club who led the initiative. This again undermines the independence of the judiciary. He even went further to amend Article 88 to remove the full judicial supervision of elections in favor of creating an electoral commission (Ottaway & Chouciar, 2008, p. 27). All though this should be seen as a positive political development, the signs are that this institution will not be allowed to function independently.

Other internal measures that constrained civil society and political parties from participating in governance are the changes in Law 114 of 1983. This law changed the electoral system from the previous individual candidacy or “first past the poll” system to that of a party-list or “proportional representation” system by which a political party would need to gain a minimum of 8 percent of nationwide vote in order for its representative to enter the legislature. This law excluded independent candidates and reduced the number of constituencies from 176 to 48, in what might be described as political gerrymandering (Kassem, 2004. p.60)

The state implemented amendments to the penal code and the law on state security courts via Law 97 in July 1992. These include death penalty and expanded the definition of terrorism “spreading panic and obstructing the work of authorities.” This is further compounded by the Supreme Constitutional Court's reaffirmation of the president's right to refer any crime to a military tribunal in 1993 (Kassem, 2004, p. 155).

With the various constraints imposed on party formation and participation, political parties in contemporary Egypt remain weak and underdeveloped entities.

Since its establishment in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood increased its influence to bring Muslims back to the true religion, and away from the corrupt aspirations and conduct created by European domination. Kassem (2004) points out that the more repressive the measures implemented by the state to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood, the more spiral violence escalated, as Islamist continued to direct numerous acts of violence against the regime and anything they perceived to be associated with it. When under Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood suffered in an unprecedented manner, the reaction of the Brotherhood was to produce a reactionary Islamic Ideology with extremist interpretations (Kassem, 2004, p.138). Similarly, when Sadat's courtship with the Brotherhood failed, leading to a major crackdown on them, the result was his assassination in 1981. Correspondingly, assassination of state officials, public figures, attempts on the life of Mubarak, culminating in the Luxor massacre are some of the reactions from the Brotherhood in response to government crackdowns on Islamic targets in their recent forms (Kassem, 2004, p. 156).

As part of his 2005 presidential campaign, Mubarak promised to lift the state of emergency which has been in existence since the assassination of Sadat, and to replace it with a more limited antiterrorism law. But when the constitutional amendments were unveiled in early 2007, the amended article rather constitutionalized the very procedures from the emergency laws that had drawn objection. Article 179 gave the president the authority to remand civilians to trials in military courts in cases related to terrorism and allowed the state to suspend human rights protections as it deemed necessary to combat terrorism (Ottaway & Chouciar, 2008, p. 29).

External factors also play major roles in shaping the Egyptian political landscape. Sadat's open door policy (infitah) had produced huge socioeconomic gap between the rich elite and the poor majority. The Camp David Accords, which Sadat signed with Israel in 1979, added fuel to the opposition fire. In addition, Sadat's decision to give refuge to the shah of Iran in defiance of the New Islamic Republic (1979) was seen as contemptuous. All this culminated in the formal expulsion of Egypt from the League of Arab Nations and sealing Sadat's fate. Things came to a head when Sadat arrested 1 500 critics, most of whom were Islamists. Within a month, Islamist assassinated Sadat during the annual 6th October parade (Kassem, 2004, p. 144).

When the opposition, under the weight of all the frustrations and impediments, decided to boycott the 1990 elections, the events lost impact due to the national and international preoccupation with events unfolding prior and during the Gulf War (1990-1991).

The 11 September 2001 attacks on the US that resulted in the destruction of the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon by Bin Laden and his Islamist groups with links with notably exiled members of the Egyptian Islamist group Al-Jihad is another external watershed which led to the use of tougher measures leading to the limiting of civil rights in Egypt. Kassem (2004) notes that six of the thirty-two most wanted terrorist on the FBI list are Egyptians, making Egypt the largest nationality represented therein.

Closely related to the foregoing is Ayman al-Zawahiri's rise to the international stage of terrorism. This can be interpreted as a direct consequence of the Egyptian state's policies toward the Islamist. The inability of the Egyptian system to regulate political dissent in a civil and orderly manner means that when faced with a threat that is politically capable of challenging the political status quo, it results to repression as the primary solution to the problem, and this way hardliners resort to guerilla tactic attacks on the Egyptian state and its allies (Kassem, 2004, p.162)

In addition, the existence of Western and particularly US support of the regime since the 1970s has allowed the political system in Egypt to adopt disparate liberal guises while in fact doing little to encourage genuine change with regard to the country's personal authoritarian rule. While international pressure for democratization may be vocal and at times linked to aid, in practice economic and security interest continue to take priority over genuine pressures to democratize. The US continues to collude with regimes [such as Egypt's Mubarak] in power permitting fixed elections and human rights fakery (Kassem, 2004, p. 2004).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is discernable that a combination of internal and external factors, coupled with personal disposition has made it possible for the perpetuation of 6 decades of autocratic rule in the face of democratization on the African continent. Whereas Zimbabwe, Kenya and as host of African countries were under intense pressure to create political space for dissent, Egypt has maintained or even tighten its political space around the same period. This indicates that the road to democratic rule could be bumpy and not a straight forward one.

It is also clear that there is a six-decade unbroken military leadership in Egypt which derived its authority from the army, using this authority to aggrandize its own autocratic rule at the expense of civil liberties and human rights. In constituting the government there is also a great deal of manipulation of all important state institutions with party loyalist and apparatchiks at the helm of most institutions.

There are, however a few signs depicting some sort of political opening in Egypt. For example, the amendment of Article 76 2007 giving each licensed party the right to put a candidate on the ballot for the first time in since independent presents a unique opportunity which offer some form of choice to the electorate, an opportunity hitherto restricted by law (Ottaway & Chouciar, 2008, p.26). A further indication is the “anticipated demilitarization” of the presidency by 2011. The ruling National Democratic Party has indicated that a nominee for the president on its ticket must have been in the party's senior leadership for at least a year, a process which effectively excludes active military or security officers, who are barred from party membership, from being presidential contenders. This has changed the fundamentals of presidential succession increasing the likelihood that after Mubarak, Egyptians will have their first civilian leader since 1952 (Ottaway & Chouciar, 2008, p. 30)

Also note worthy are articles 115 and 127 which gave the legislature more meaningful budget oversight and specifies clear procedures for voting no confidence in the Prime Minister (Ottaway, 2008, p. 29). This coupled with the creation of National Council on Human Rights and electoral commission has the potential of legitimizing political activism by civil society groups.

Although these few changes portend future opening up of the political system for participation, it is obvious that in the foreseeable future, Egypt will remain an autocracy in an era of democracy. A combination of political activism and other domestic crisis in Egypt have failed to set in motion a transition to democracy. The implication is that external actors like the US and the European union which have been vociferous somewhere in Zimbabwe and Iran, must begin to highlight the regimes flaws and vulnerability in order to strengthen the opposition in that country in confronting the despot. But the feasibility of that project is in doubt as the US and the EU interest in the Suez Canal and the danger of the country falling into the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood outweigh human rights and other considerations.

Overall, the competition between the divergent political groupings, secular and religious, will continue to weaken opposition to the ruling NDP internally for a longtime to come. This offers the leadership of the NDP a unique opportunity to continue to exploit the situation through coercion, containment, and repression to maintain its hold on power and wealth to the detriment of greater political participation of the citizenry.

Postscript -
The appointment of Omar Suleimna by beleaguered Mubarak, apparently to appease “the people's uprising,” is an indication that the military is not prepared to relinquish power in Egypt easily. Suleiman is an establishment front for an old tired regime. The message must be ringing loud in the remaining fiefdoms on the African continent – Cameroon, Uganda, Libya, Togo, among others. If Ben could be just out just a year after winning a fifth term with 90% of the votes, it raises many questions about the electoral process itself. This is the people's coupe d'état, we wait to see which of the remaining fiefdoms will catch the bug next.

REFERENCES:
Brownlee, Jason. (2007). Authoritarianism in the age of Democratization. Cambridge:

Cambridge Press
Cook, Steven. (2007). Ruling but not Governing: the military and political development in Egypt,

Algeria, Turkey. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press

El-Mikawy, Noha. (1999). The Building of Consensus in Egypt's Transition Process. Cairo: The

American University in Cairo Press
Esposito, John & Voll, John. (1996). Islam and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kassem, Maye. (2004). Egyptian Politics: the dynamics of authoritarian rule. Boulder, Colo:

Lynne Rienner Publishers
Moyo, Dambisa. (2009). Dead Aid: why aid is not working and how there is a better way for

Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux
Ottaway, Marina & Choucair-Vizoso, Julia. (2008). Beyond the Façade: political reforms in the

Arab World. Washington, D.C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Rutherford, Bruce. (2008). Egypt after Mubarak: liberalism, Islam, and democracy in the Arab

World. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Tate, Gregory. (1998). Democratization and Islamization in Egypt: counterbalancing forces for

autocracy. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
USAID. (April, 2007) U.S. Aid to Egypt Totaled US$28 Billion in Three Decades. Available at:

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/features/egypt/ Accessed 11/16/09

Prosper Yao Tsikata

body-container-line